The End Game of Deregulation: Myopic Risk Management and the Next Catastrophe by McGarity, Thomas O. & Steinzor, Rena I.
McGarity 12.17 (Do Not Delete) 12/17/2012 2:51 PM 
 
93 
THE END GAME OF DEREGULATION: 
MYOPIC RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE NEXT 
CATASTROPHE 
THOMAS O. MCGARITY & RENA I. STEINZOR† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On December 22, 2008, the contents of an enormous 
impoundment containing coal-ash slurry from the Tennessee Valley 
Authority’s (TVA) Kingston Fossil Fuel Plant poured into the Emory 
River. The proximate cause of the spill was the bursting of a poorly 
reinforced dike holding back a pit of sludge that towered 80 feet 
above the river and 40 feet above an adjacent road.1 The volume and 
force of the spill were so large that 1.1 billion gallons of the inky mess 
flowed across the river, inundating 300 acres of land in a layer four to 
five feet deep, uprooting trees, destroying three homes, and damaging 
dozens of others.2 The catastrophic breach ruptured a gas line, caused 
millions of dollars in property damage, and caused incalculable 
environmental damage to the Emory River and its receiving water, 
the Clinch River.3 A week after the spill, heaps of gray material 
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 1.   R. WILLIAM IDE III & JOSEPH O. BLANCO, MCKENNA, LONG & ALDRIDGE LLP, A 
REPORT TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 
REGARDING KINGSTON FACTUAL FINDINGS 4–5 (2009). 
 2.   Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of Special 
Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128, 
35,150 (proposed June 21, 2010); Lynn L. Bergeson, EPA Responds to Coal Ash Release, 
Pollution Engineering, May 2009, at 19; Editorial, Pool of Trouble, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2009, 
at A12. 
 3.   Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System, supra note 2, at 35,150; Richard 
Fausset, Ash Spill Leaves Future Hazy, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 1, 2009, at C14; Shaila Dewan, Ash 
Flood in Tennessee Is Found to Be Larger Than Initial Estimates, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2008, at 
A10; Shaila Dewan, Coal Ash Flood Revives Debate About Hazards, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2008, 
at A1.  
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remained in the river like small volcanic islands.4 Miraculously, no 
one was killed.5  
The slurry contained both fly and bottom ash, collectively known 
as “coal combustion residuals” (CCRs) in the euphemistic lexicon of 
environmental regulation.6 Because coal-fired power plants have 
scrubbers that trap fumes before they are emitted into ambient air, 
the fly-ash portion of the spill contained significantly more than the 
quota of toxic heavy metals that typically result from burning coal.7 
Or, in other words, in an inevitable but ironic twist, the benefits to 
breathers were obtained at the expense of walkers and drinkers. TVA 
later estimated that the Kingston Spill had released around 2.6 
million pounds of toxic pollutants into the Emory River.8 By way of 
comparison, all of the other power plants in the United States 
released just over 2 million pounds of toxic pollutants during all of 
2007.9 Cleanup costs for the federally subsidized TVA, one of the 
largest electric utilities in the country, are expected to total $1.2 
billion, adding $0.69 per month to the utility bills of nine million 
customers until 2024.10 
The Kingston spill was the worst of its kind in U.S. history, but it 
was not the first, nor would it be the last. For a brief period of time, 
the catastrophe focused the nation’s attention on the health and 
environmental risks posed by dumping coal ash in unlined pits in the 
 
 4.  Fausset, supra note 3, at C14. 
      5.    Id. 
 6.  “Coal combustion residuals” consist of fly ash, bottom ash, boiler slag, and flue gas 
desulfurization materials that are destined for disposal. Other names given to these wastes 
include “coal combustion wastes” and “fossil fuel combustion wastes.” See Hazardous and Solid 
Waste Management System, 75 Fed. Reg. at 35,130. 
 7.   Notice of Availability of Preliminary 2010 Effluent Guidelines Program Plan, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 68,599 (Dec. 28, 2009).  
 8.   Charlotte E. Tucker, Kingston Spill Released 2.6 Million Pounds of Pollutants, 
Environmental Group Says, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 2826 (Dec. 11, 2009).  
 9.   Id. 
      10.     TVA contractors removed more that 5.4 million cubic yards of material and 
transported the bulk of it to a landfill in Alabama. Cleanup efforts were expected to last well 
into 2014, at which point the residential neighborhood would be converted to a park. Bob 
Fowler, Three Years Later, Kingston Ash Spill Cleanup Continues, KNOXNEWS.COM, 
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/dec/19/three-years-later-kingston-ash-spill-cleanup (last 
updated Dec. 19, 2011). TVA also spent more that $46 million purchasing 171 damaged 
properties. Dylan Lovan, Residents, Activists prod EPA for Coal Ash Rules, CNS NEWS (April 
18, 2012), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/residents-activists-prod-epa-coal-ash-rules-0 (stating 
that the utility has “spent $46 million in buying up some 900 acres” near the plant from about 
150 owners). In addition to paying $22 million in fines to regulators, TVA agreed to commit $43 
million to economic development projects in the county. Shaila Dewan, T.V.A. to Pay $43 
Million on Projects in Spill Area, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2009, at A13.  
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ground referred to as “surface impoundments.”11 Prominent national 
environmental groups demanded greater protection from Congress 
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), both of which had 
long skittered away from confronting the problem in the face of 
unyielding resistance by electric utilities to any hint of regulatory 
intervention that would compel the safer disposal of coal ash and the 
reinforcement of old, poorly designed, and carelessly maintained 
coal-ash dumps.12 
In the immediate aftermath of the catastrophe, Congressman 
Nick Rahall (D-WV) introduced a bill that would have authorized the 
Department of Interior to promulgate uniform federal design, 
engineering, and performance standards for new coal-ash 
impoundments.13 Three congressional committees devoted six 
hearings to the need for proper regulation of coal-ash wastes.14 
Notably, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson promised to reevaluate by 
the end of 2009 the agency’s decades-old reluctance to regulate the 
disposal of some 129 million tons of coal ash generated annually,15 a 
startling figure when compared to the 250 million tons of every 
category of household garbage that Americans generated in 2010.16 
 
 11.  Subpart A – Classification of Solid Waste Disposal Facilities and Practices, 40 C.F.R. § 
257.2 (2001).  
 12.  Juliet Eilperin, Disposal of Coal Ash Rises As Environmental Issue, WASH. POST, Jan. 
16, 2009, at A4.  
 13.  See id.; Charlotte E. Tucker, Bill Would Require Coal Combustion Waste Regulation 
Under Surface Mining Control Act, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 171 (Jan. 23, 2009). 
 14.  TVA’s Kingston Ash Slide: Evaluation of Potential Causes and Updates on Cleanup 
Efforts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Water Res.s and the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Transp. 
and Infrastructure, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009) [hereinafter Ash Spill Causes Hearing]; Coal 
Combustion Byproducts: Potential Impact of a Hazardous Waste Designation on Small 
Businesses in the Recycling Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Rural Dev., 
Entrepreneurship and Trade of the H. Small Bus. Comm., 111th Cong., 2d Sess. (2010); Coal 
Combustion Waste Storage and Water Quality: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water Res. and 
the Env’t of the House Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009); The 
Tennessee Valley Authority’s Kingston Ash Slide: Potential Water Quality Impacts of Coal 
Combustion Waste Storage: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 
111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009); Hearings before the Subcomm. on Energy and Mineral Res. of the 
H. Comm. on Natural Res., 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009); Oversight Hearing on the Tennessee 
Valley Authority and the Recent Major Coal Ash Spill: Before the S. Comm. on Env’t and Public 
Works, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009).  
 15.   Shaila Dewan, Administration Plans New Regulations On Coal-Ash Ponds by End of 
the Year, N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 2009, at A20; Eilperin, supra note 12, at A4.  
 16.  U.S. EPA, MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE GENERATION, RECYCLING, AND DISPOSAL IN 
THE UNITED STATES: FACTS AND FIGURES FOR 2010 (2011).  
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Jackson met this deadline.17 But her efforts were thwarted when 
an intensive industry lobbying campaign provoked the White House 
to rewrite the EPA proposal, adding two significantly weaker options 
and derailing the momentum of Jackson’s proposal.18 The 111th 
Congress failed to enact protective legislation and, in the aftermath of 
the 2010 mid-term election that transferred control of the House of 
Representatives back to the Republican Party, the 112th Congress 
nearly enacted legislation that would have divested the EPA of its 
authority to adopt strong coal-ash rules.19 Four years after Kingston, 
the federal government has yet to take action despite another large 
spill into Lake Michigan.20 To the extent that such disposal is 
regulated at all, it is subject only to erratic and often ineffective state 
regulatory controls.21 
In the past, catastrophic events like the Kingston disaster have 
resulted in dramatic governmental reforms, pushing the law forward 
to meet new challenges and provide expanded protection for public 
health and the environment. Congress enacted most of the regulatory 
statutes of the Progressive Era, the New Deal, and the Public Interest 
Era22 after widely publicized tragedies or abuses stirred public opinion 
to levels sufficient to overcome the inertia that otherwise overwhelms 
 
 17.  Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of Special 
Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128, 
35,153 (proposed June 21, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 261, 264, 265, 268, 271, 
302). 
     18.     James Goodwin, The Delays Get Delayier: The Sad First Year of EPA’s Coal Ash 
Proposal, CPR BLOG (May 4, 2011), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog= 
BB2B286A-9713-BCF4-C74CD4C1151572A8. For an explanation of the two new options, see 
infra note 198 and accompanying text.  
 19.  H.R. 2273, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 20.  Michael Bologna, Sierra Club Plans Lawsuit Against Utility Over Coal Ash Incident 
Near Milwaukee, 42 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 2578, (2011); Nora Macaluso, Power Plant 
Bluff Collapse Dumps Coal Ash into Lake Michigan; Cleanup Under Way, 42 ENV'T REP. CUR. 
DEV. (BNA) 2473 (2011).  
 21.  Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of Special 
Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128, 
35,133 (stating that 67% of utilities do not have liner requirements for CCR surface 
impoundments), 35,152 (“[O]f the 36 states that have CCR surface impoundments, 25 have 
permit programs. Permitting is particularly important to provide oversight and to approve 
implementation plans such as the placement of groundwater monitoring wells. Without a state 
permit program, regulatory flexibility is limited, and certification by an independent registered 
professional engineer is necessary.”).  
 22.  Here, the “Public Interest Era” refers to the period of active government extending 
roughly from the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s. 
McGarity 12.17 (Do Not Delete) 12/17/2012  2:51 PM 
Fall 2012] THE END GAME OF DEREGULATION 97 
Congress and the regulatory agencies.23 For example, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission reacted to the Three Mile Island near-
meltdown in 1979 by putting into place much stricter regulatory 
requirements for power plants.24 The Federal Aviation 
Administration has developed a set of new airline safety 
requirements following nearly every major passenger airplane crash.25 
The EPA asked for and received authority from Congress to regulate 
fugitive releases from chemical plants following the December 1984 
explosion at the Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal, India that 
killed 2,000 people.26 
But in the context of more recent history, the passive response to 
the Kingston spill was not an outlier. The past decade has witnessed a 
confluence of crises across a broad array of federal regulatory 
programs. The response by Congress and the regulatory agencies to 
most of these multiple crises has been tepid at best. The Deepwater 
Horizon explosion and oil spill of April 2010 generated no new 
legislation, and the regulatory response amounted only to a modest 
reorganization and renaming of the agency that had utterly failed—
and is still failing—to regulate deepwater oil and gas drilling.27 The 
Upper Big Branch (UBB) mine disaster in the same month likewise 
generated no new legislation and no significant regulatory reforms.28 
Even when crises did stimulate Congress to act, the changes were by 
no means dramatic. The Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act 
(CPSIA) of 2008 did little to enhance the Consumer Product Safety 
 
 23.  THOMAS O. MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO HARM (forthcoming 2013); Richard J. Lazarus, 
Climate Change Law In and Over Time, 2 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 29, 33–34 
(2010); Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing Centralized White House Regulatory Review, 1 
MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 209, 217–18 (2012). 
 24.  Christian Perenti, After Three Mile Island: The Rise and Fall of Nuclear Safety Culture, 
THE NATION (Mar. 22, 2012), available at http://www.thenation.com/article/159386/after-three-
mile-island-rise-and-fall-nuclear-safety-culture#. 
 25.   MCGARITY, supra note 23. 
 26.   Bhopal (Chemical Leak), N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2011), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/ 
news/international/countriesandterritories/india/bhopal/index.html; Envtl. Prot. Agency, Clean 
Air Act Section 112(r): Accidental Release Prevention/Risk Management Plan Rule (2009), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/oem/docs/chem/caa112_rmp_factsheet.pdf. 
 27.  Pam R. Russell, Oil Spill Legislation Shows Signs of Clip-Sliding Away, CONG. 
QUARTERLY, Apr. 23, 2012, at 798; Robin Bravender & Katie Howell, Fallout Begins After 
Senate’s Failure to Act on Energy, Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/08/05/05greenwire-fallout-begins-after-senates-failure-to-
act-on-54000.html. 
 28.  Kim Geiger et al., Miners’ Survivors Feel Let Down: A Year After a Blast Killed 29, a 
Safety Bill has Failed and Efforts to Boost Enforcement are Mired in Appeals, L.A. TIMES, May 
8, 2011, at A18.  
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Commission’s (CPSC) capacity to reduce the risks posed by imported 
products, and Congress soon amended the statute to provide broad 
exemptions from its lead-poisoning prevention requirements for 
existing toys.29 The Food Safety Modernization Act of 2010 left much 
of the responsibility for protecting the public from contaminated food 
in the hands of food producers subject to oversight by a resource-
starved FDA, and it did nothing at all to cure the overlapping 
jurisdiction, misplaced priorities, and weak enforcement that have 
plagued food-safety regulation since the early twentieth century.30 
This recent history raises the question of why the twentieth-
century dynamic of crisis and reform has apparently disappeared in 
the early twenty-first century. Using the Kingston catastrophe as a 
case study, this article offers several explanations for this unfortunate 
trend. We argue that regulated industries dominate regulatory 
debates on Capitol Hill and at the federal agencies to an 
unprecedented extent. Rather than stressing the importance of 
science-based rulemaking, the White House has engaged in its own 
intemperate interventions, upping the ante for flexing raw political 
muscle at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. The growing weakness 
of the media’s investigative reporting has exacerbated both trends.31 
In the end, these factors have sparked the deeply disturbing evolution 
of the administrative process into a kind of “blood sport.”32 This 
degeneration’s most obvious and immediate threat is to our shared 
“commons,”33 but over the long run it is equally likely to cause 
irrevocable harm to individual businesses and to the efficient 
functioning of regulated markets. 
Part II examines what we know about the Kingston spill and the 
implications of that information for a recurrence of such events. Part 
III explains how the EPA and Congress responded to this disaster, 
 
 29.  MCGARITY, supra note 23; Steinzor, supra note 23, at 218–19. 
 30.  MCGARITY, supra note 23; Steinzor, supra note 23, at 218–19. 
 31.  See, e.g., Jodi Enda, Capital Flight, AM. J. REV. Summer 2010, at 15 (finding watchdog 
reporting is at an alarming low at many federal agencies and departments whose actions have a 
huge impact on the lives of American citizens).  
 32.   See Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport, Policy Erosion in a 
Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1671 (2012) (noting “that in this era of deep division 
over the proper role of government in society, highstakes rulemaking has become a ‘blood 
sport’ in which regulated industries, and occasionally beneficiary groups, are willing to spend 
millions of dollars to shape public opinion and influence powerful political actors to exert 
political pressure on agencies”).  
 33.    See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968) (noting 
that tragedy can ensue when each actor tries to maximize his or her gain at the expense of the 
common good when resources are shared).  
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highlighting how politics driven by a deregulatory ideology eventually 
swamped the EPA’s deliberative, science-based rulemaking process. 
Part IV offers some suggestions for rebuilding regulatory agencies 
like the EPA and for restoring public trust in government as first 
steps on the way to a regulatory regime that is capable of preventing 
future Kingston tragedies. 
II. THE KINGSTON SPILL 
A. An Engineering Fiasco 
For more than half a century, TVA power plant near Kingston 
dumped its coal ash in a huge, 100-acre impoundment.34 Like many 
other coal-ash surface impoundments, the Kingston facility was built 
out of the material that it held—compacted coal ash and earth.35 Since 
the dikes that formed the walls of the facility had to stay dry to retain 
their strength, the slurry dumped into the pit had to be wet enough to 
keep the ash from becoming wind-borne, but not so wet that it would 
weaken the dikes.36 This impossibly delicate balance was born of 
expediency, not sound engineering. 
In the immediate aftermath of the spill, TVA CEO Tom Kilgore 
blamed the spill on heavy rain and freezing temperatures just prior to 
the breach.37 Anticipating litigation, TVA’s general counsel hired 
AECOM, a geotechnical-engineering consulting company with 
expertise in forensic analysis, to conduct a study of the “root causes” 
of the spill.38 The firm concluded that the spill was caused by a 
combination of four conditions—a layer of unstable “slime” 
composed of ash and silt eighty feet below the surface of the 
impoundment, the high water content of the sluiced ash, the 
increasing height of the ash, and the construction of sloping dikes 
over the wet ash.39 The study concluded that although the 
impoundment was “on the verge of failure,” TVA employees had 
 
 34.   Bergeson, supra note 2, at 19. 
 35.   IDE III ET AL., supra note 1, at 7. 
 36.   Ed Marcum, TVA Trial Raises Questions of Culture, KNOXVILLEBIZ.COM (Nov. 6, 
2011), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/nov/06/tva-trial-raises-questions-of-culture/.  
      37.     John Broder, Plant That Spilled Coal Ash Had Earlier Leak Problems, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 9, 2009, at A11.  
 38.   Ash Spill Causes Hearing, supra note 14 (testimony of Tom Kilgore, CEO, TVA). 
 39.    Id.; AECOM, ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS OF TVA KINGSTON DREDGE POND FAILURE 
ON DECEMBER 22, 2008, 81 (2009); Bill Poovey, TVA Attorney Says No Proof Negligence 
Caused Spill, KNOXVILLEBIZ.COM (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/oct/12/ 
tva-coal-ash-trial-at-closing-arguments/.  
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observed “no visible signs of distress . . . that would have indicated 
that a deep-seated failure was about to occur.”40 
Critiques soon emerged challenging the credibility of AECOM’s 
findings. Earthjustice charged that the consultant had failed to 
examine whether the company’s negligence played any role in the 
collapse.41 TVA’s Inspector General (TVA IG) later said that one 
reason for commissioning the AECOM study was to lessen legal 
liability.42 The consultant was told specifically “not to judge TVA 
employees and contractors” in determining the spill’s cause.43 
According to the senior manager of TVA’s Coal Combustion 
Byproducts group, TVA wanted AECOM to point the finger at 
circumstances that the company could not control.44 The TVA IG 
concluded: “[l]itigation strategy seems to have prevailed over 
transparency and accountability” to the point that the AECOM study 
put too much weight on the “slime” theory and insufficiently 
emphasized the TVA’s institutional failures.45 An engineering 
consultant hired by the TVA IG concluded that “AECOM’s 
emphasis on the “slime layer . . . inappropriately diminishe[d] the role 
that the design and operation of the Kingston ash pond played in the 
spill.”46 
A technical advisory panel assembled by the Governor of 
Tennessee to investigate the Kingston catastrophe agreed with 
AECOM that “the weak foundation interface layer likely did 
contribute to the failure that occurred,” but added that “the stability 
 
 40.  AECOM, supra note 39, at 81. At the trial of the landowners’ lawsuit against TVA, the 
engineer who headed up the AECOM study emphasized the report’s conclusion that the spill 
was caused by a “slime layer” of ash that gave way much like yogurt becomes more fluid when it 
is stirred. Poovey, supra note 39. 
 41.  Charlotte E. Tucker, TVA Cites Multiple Causes for Spill; Environmental Group 
Criticizes Agency, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 1561 (July 3, 2009).  
 42.  See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, 
REVIEW OF THE KINGSTON FOSSIL PLANT ASH SPILL ROOT CAUSE STUDY AND 
OBSERVATIONS ABOUT ASH MANAGEMENT i (2009) [hereinafter REVIEW OF ASH SPILL 
CAUSES].  
 43.  Bill Poovey, TVA Watchdog Inspector Testifies at Spill Trial, KNOXVILLEBIZ.COM 
(Oct. 11, 2011), available at http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/oct/11/trial-on-tva-ash-spill-
lawsuits-starting-4th/.  
 44.   Bill Poovey, TVA Manager Testifies for Ash Spill Plaintiffs, KNOXVILLEBIZ.COM 
(Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/oct/05/plaintiff-expert-in-ash-
spill-trial-blames-tva/. 
 45.   REVIEW OF ASH SPILL CAUSES, supra note 42, at 4; Poovey, supra note 39. 
 46.   REVIEW OF ASH SPILL CAUSES, supra note 42, at 18 (noting that the TVA senior 
manager testified that she viewed the “slime” theory as a “little bit bogus.”); Poovey, supra note 
44.  
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of the Kingston dredge cells” was at a “critical state of failure 
regardless of the presence of the emphasized layer of weak 
foundation material.”47 The panel further concluded that a “critical 
deficiency” at the facility was “an apparent lack of understanding or 
consideration of the evolutionary process of the construction at the 
TVA Kingston plant.”48 In addition, TVA lacked an “on-going, 
consistent method of design evaluation, documentation and 
communication to manage the evolutionary process.”49 “[T]he types 
of materials used in the construction of the Kingston dredge cell were 
assumed to perform similarly to conventional soil materials,” but the 
sluiced fly-ash materials did not in fact “behave in a manner 
consistent with conventional clay and silt embankment 
construction.”50 
The lack of engineering design for the raising of the cells, the 
inadequately understood material properties, pore pressure 
dissipation properties and material consolidation mechanisms of 
the ash, the methods of placement of the ash, the staged upstream 
construction, and the dredging activities all contributed to the 
condition of the pre-failure structure.51 
In short, from an engineering perspective, the impoundment was a 
disaster waiting to happen, and it was attributable to both technical 
and institutional failures. 
B. Institutional Culture 
Severe management problems also undermined TVA’s ability to 
recognize that the Kingston coal-ash pond was unstable. As the 
impoundments evolved over the years, the organizational entities 
within TVA responsible for the safety of the dikes changed, and the 
employees responsible for modifying the impoundments no longer 
adhered to the original design theories for the facility.52 Among other 
things, the original design called for earthen dikes, not dikes made 
partially out of coal ash.53 An expert engineer for adjacent landowners 
 
 47.   TDEC ADVISORY BOARD, LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE TVA KINGSTON DREDGE 
CELL CONTAINMENT FACILITY FAILURE 14 (2009) [hereinafter TDEC LESSONS LEARNED]. 
 48.   Id. at 5.  
 49.   Id.  
 50.   Id. at 6.  
 51.   Id. at 14–15.  
      52.     IDE III ET AL., supra note 1, at 13, 16–17. 
 53.   Ed Marcum, Expert Says TVA Coal Ash Dike Not Built as Planned, KNOXNEWS.COM 
(Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/sep/28/expert-says-tva-coal-ash-dike-not-
built-as/.  
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in subsequent litigation concluded that the departure from the 
original plans resulted in a dike that was significantly less stable than 
the original design.54 He testified that when TVA wanted to raise the 
level of the dike in 1975, a consultant’s study revealed that the 
foundation of the original dike failed to conform to the original 
design and that the dike therefore became weaker as its height 
increased..55 
In a comprehensive report to Congress, the TVA IG found that, 
for more than a decade prior to the spill, managers had received 
multiple warnings from employees and consultants raising “red flags” 
about the safety of the retention pond, but “for reasons that are still 
not entirely clear,” they had failed to make “appropriate safety 
modifications” to address the problems.56 In April 1985, a TVA 
engineer wrote a memorandum to upper-level officials raising his 
concerns about the stability of Dike C. The memorandum stated that 
the actual construction of Dike C did not conform to the design 
drawings for the dike and that preventive measures used in building 
Dike C were insufficient. The memorandum therefore recommended 
that management assign someone to inspect Dike C on a daily basis 
to look for signs of instability.57 The TVA IG’s consulting engineer 
agreed that the “safety factor” employed in building the dike was 
“less than the minimum acceptable value of 1.5” and that TVA’s 
construction of additional capacity, raising elevations above the 
original containment dike system, may have further decreased the 
margin of safety. 58 
Another memorandum, written in 1987, from the TVA’s 
Director of Environmental Quality to the TVA Manager of Policy, 
Planning, and Budget stated that, “expansions of ash ponds” had 
resulted in dikes containing the wet ash becoming “quite high with 
increasing risk and consequences of a breech.”59 To address “the 
potential for harm to both surface and groundwater from the failure 
of a dike,” the memorandum recommended that the “establishment 
of more specific inspection standards for these dikes should be 
examined.”60 The memorandum triggered a discussion among some 
 
     54.     See id. (stating that the subsoils became weaker as the depth increased). 
     55.     Id.  
      56.    REVIEW OF ASH SPILL CAUSES, supra note 42, at 18. 
      57.     Id. at 19.  
     58.     Id.  
      59.     Id. at 6.  
      60.     Id.  
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TVA officials about “whether the ash ponds should have been 
managed under TVA’s Dam Safety Program, which would have 
required substantially more rigorous inspections and engineering.”61 
Those involved decided not to change these procedures.62 
Responding to a small, localized leak at the Kingston retention 
pond in 2003, TVA hired a consulting engineer to conduct a slope-
stability analysis of the pond. The engineer observed “a 7- to 10-foot 
thick layer of loose ash immediately overlaying the clay soil beneath 
the ash pond” that could undergo “liquefaction” under some 
conditions, including a seismic event.63 Although the probability of 
such an event was “extremely low,” the consultant noted that the 
existing methods for predicting liquefaction were “insufficient” and 
recommended that TVA improve the drainage in the pond.64 Instead 
of implementing the recommendation, TVA hired a second 
contractor, Geosyntec, to undertake a peer review of the disposal 
plans for the facility and of the prior consultant’s memorandum.65 
Geosyntec concluded that the “potential for liquefaction should be 
estimated and, depending on the results of this estimate, a 
liquefaction analysis may be required.”66 If the analysis concluded that 
the site was likely to liquefy, then “ground improvement techniques 
need to be implemented.”67 Upper-level management failed to 
respond to this report.68 A consulting engineer hired by the TVA IG 
concluded that the Geosyntec report indicated “the expansion design 
should have been modified to conform to a more stringent design 
configuration.”69 Another expert, hired by the plaintiffs in the 
landowner litigation, testified that the Geosyntec report was 
“virtually saying that the site slopes are not safe for supporting people 
or construction equipment.”70 
 
 61.  Id.  
 62.  Id.  
 63.  Id. at 19. 
 64.  Id. at 19–20. 
 65.  Id. at 20.  
 66.  Id.  
 67.  Id.  
 68.  Id.  
 69.  Id.  
 70.  Ed Marcum, Expert Witness Says TVA Failed to Act on 2003 Dike Failure, 
KNOXNEWS.COM (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/sep/29/expert-witness-
says-tva-failed-to-act-on-2003/. 
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In the end, the TVA IG identified “systemic problems that ha[d] 
their genesis in the culture” of the organization.71 Senior managers 
“relegated ash to the status of garbage at a landfill rather than 
treating it as a potential hazard to the public and the environment.”72 
A TVA-sponsored review by the law firm McKenna, Long & 
Aldridge identified “culture failures” that allowed unsafe “conditions 
to occur and remain undetected or unaddressed.”73 The McKenna, 
Long & Aldridge report described a “siloed” decision-making 
structure under which “[n]o fewer than four separate TVA divisions 
had responsibilities related to the huge utility’s coal ash facilities. 
Although the various responsibilities necessarily overlapped and were 
interdependent, communication between the groups was strained and 
in some instances, non-existent.”74 The senior manager in charge of 
handling coal ash at the facility testified that when leaks were 
discovered in the dikes, the engineering department was responsible 
for identifying the problem and proposing a solution, her department 
was responsible for budgeting resources to carry out the repair, and 
the heavy equipment division was responsible for implementing the 
fix.75 With so many groups involved in managing the retention ponds, 
a “lack of accountability” prevailed—orders were considered 
recommendations and engineers responsible for annual inspections 
made the same recommendations year after year.76 TVA’s CEO 
admitted that “[w]ith little sharing of information internally and no 
clear accountability, a culture was created in which the management, 
storage and disposal of coal ash and other combustion products were 
not seen as significant as other aspects of TVA’s operations.”77 He 
agreed that TVA required a change in the “overall culture” of the 
organization “to improve the rigor and discipline with which we 
approach every aspect of our work.”78 
Other institutional, managerial, and cultural deficiencies 
compounded these fundamental communication problems and 
pervasive lack of accountability: TVA did not provide adequate 
 
 71.  REVIEW OF ASH SPILL CAUSES, supra note 42, at 30. 
 72.  Ash Spill Causes Hearing, supra note 14, at 122 (statement of Richard Moore, 
Inspector General, TVA). 
 73.  IDE III ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.  
 74.  Id. at 19.  
 75.  Marcum, supra note 36. 
 76.  IDE III ET AL., supra note 1, at 2–3.  
 77.  Ash Spill Causes Hearing, supra note 14, at 164 (testimony of Tom Kilgore, CEO, 
TVA).  
 78.  Id. at 163–65; IDE III ET AL., supra note 1, at 3. 
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training and education to those responsible for building and 
maintaining the CCR impoundments;79 it did not provide written 
standard operating procedures for constructing, operating, and 
maintaining the retention ponds;80 it did not pay sufficient attention to 
quality assurance and quality control with respect to ash disposal;81 it 
devoted inadequate resources to maintaining the coal-ash 
impoundments;82 it reacted to seeps (leaks) and other safety-related 
problems with inexpensive “fixes” rather than addressing the 
underlying causes;83 and its upper-level management resisted taking 
safety-related advice from knowledgeable employees.84 The TVA IG 
concluded that “TVA was on notice about safety issues” and that 
“those safety issues were not addressed by TVA.”85 Its consulting 
engineer went a step further, concluding that TVA “could have 
possibly prevented the Kingston Spill” if it had implemented the 
modifications recommended in the 2004 Geosyntec report.86 
In the aftermath of the spill, TVA promised fundamental 
changes,87 but its public actions give little reason for confidence that 
its institutional culture will change anytime soon. Despite the multiple 
findings of independent investigators, TVA has relentlessly refused to 
recognize the full panoply of internal problems that caused the spill. 
Instead, it has steadfastly maintained that the dike failure was caused 
by building the pit over a “slime” layer of loose ash and silt eighty 
feet below the surface of the impoundment, a mistake that was made 
decades ago.88 This emphasis on the slime theory allows TVA to claim 
that current managers were not negligent,89 and supports self-serving 
claims by the electric utility industry that the Kingston spill “was a 
 
 79.  IDE III ET AL., supra note 1, at 3; Ash Spill Causes Hearing, supra note 14, at 164 
(testimony of Tom Kilgore, CEO, TVA).  
      80.    IDE III ET AL., supra note 1, at 3 
      81.   See id. at 3–4 (noting that TVA lacked a robust Quality Assurance/Quality Control 
plan, which created an environment where employees felt empowered to ignore engineers); 
Marcum, supra note 36. 
 82.   IDE III ET AL., supra note 1, at 3–4.  
 83.   Id. at 4.  
      84.   Ed Marcum, TVA Manager: Superior Ordered Deletions to Report, KNOXNEWS.COM 
(Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/oct/05/tva-manager-superior-ordered-
deletions-to-report/ (quoting Melissa Hedgecoth).  
 85.  REVIEW OF ASH SPILL CAUSES, supra note 42, at 21. 
 86.   Id.  
 87.   Id. at 37–39; Ash Spill Causes Hearing, supra note 14 (testimony of Kilgore, CEO, 
TVA); Marcum, supra note 36. 
 88.   Poovey, supra note 39.  
 89.   See REVIEW OF ASH SPILL CAUSES, supra note 42, at 18. 
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‘one-off’ event caused by a condition not believed to be present 
anywhere else in the world.”90 TVA’s active participation in the 
campaign to stifle the EPA’s efforts to regulate coal-ash disposal is 
additional discouraging evidence that its institutional culture has not 
changed sufficiently to provide adequate assurance that similar 
fiascos will not occur in the future.91 
Of course, this pattern of resistance by senior management to 
repeated warnings of pending disaster is not unique to TVA. 
Investigations of other recent disasters reveal similarly troubling, 
equally lengthy trails of internal recriminations regarding conditions 
that were at least as dangerous and that led, just as inevitably, to 
catastrophes. The most notorious example is BP (formerly British 
Petroleum), which had a long and disgraceful history of fatal 
accidents and environmentally damaging leaks at its American 
installations, from corroded and leaking oil pipelines on Alaska’s 
North Slope to the massive explosion at a Texas City refinery that 
killed eleven people.92 The huge corporation was run by executives in 
London who were focused with obsessive tunnel vision on reducing 
operating and maintenance costs.93 For example, in the wake of the 
Texas City explosion, BP hired former Secretary of State James A. 
Baker III to head up an investigative taskforce to uncover the root 
causes of the tragedy.94 The Baker commission’s 2007 report did not 
equivocate, attributing the accident to a corporate culture that 
allowed crucial components of the physical plant to “run to failure” 
and that penalized workers for expressing safety concerns.95 
In a similar vein, Massey Energy, the company that owned and 
operated the Upper Big Branch mine (UBB) when a methane gas 
explosion killed 29 miners, operated at the margins of the law, 
amassing literally thousands of violations in the years prior to the 
explosion and tying regulators in knots with appeals. Massey has 
 
 90.   Id.  
 91.   Steinzor, supra note 23, at 264–65. 
 92.   For a description of these events, see Rena Steinzor & Anne Havemann, Too Big to 
Obey: Why BP Should Be Debarred, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 81, 97–105 
(2011).  
 93.   Id.  
 94.   BAKER SAFETY REVIEW PANEL, THE REPORT OF THE B.P. U.S. REFINERIES 
INDEPENDENT SAFETY REVIEW PANEL (2007), available at http://www.bp.com/liveassets/ 
bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/SP/STAGING/local_assets/assets/pdfs/Baker_panel_
report.pdf. 
 95.   Id. 
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received 3,007 MSHA safety citations since 1995 at the UBB.96 But 
the company routinely contested these citations, avoiding correcting 
the violations and paying the penalties for months and even years in 
many instances. In 2009 alone, the company contested 34.7% of the 
516 safety violations it received.97 Massey also contested another 
$251,613 in MSHA fines for violating the UBB’s ventilation plan, a 
critical factor in the explosion.98 During the years leading up to the 
accident, Massey was assessed over $2.2 million in fines at the UBB 
and had contested about half of that amount.99 The sheer number of 
violations strongly suggests that Massey executives knew of the 
dangerous work environment at the mine. 
Because these and other fiascos have occurred in succession over 
the course of the last decade, inquiries into the adequacy of the 
responsible entity’s institutional culture with respect to known 
hazards have become de rigueur in the wake of catastrophes. Yet the 
conclusion to which these investigations invariably lead—that 
complex industrial operations engaged in high-risk operations have 
great difficulty avoiding the devastating consequences of failure—
almost never translates into the epiphany that government must step 
in both to punish past transgressions and to change the underlying 
culture. Instead, that obvious implication is shoved off the table or, in 
cases when the catastrophe is so damaging that it cannot easily be 
ignored, the individual perpetrator is written off as a “rogue” actor 
whose malfeasance is atypical of the industry. 
For example, the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) 
effectively labeled Massey as a reckless outlier when it accused the 
company of “industrial homicide” a year and a half after the UBB 
explosion.100 Coal companies also tried to distance themselves from 
the explosion by claiming that Massey was an outlier.101 The industry 
argued that while fifty-four workers were killed in Massey mines from 
2000 through 2010, the nation’s largest coal company, Peabody 
 
      96.    Brad Johnson, Deadly Record: Massey’s Mine in Montcoal has been Cited for Over 
3,000 Violations, Over $2.2 Million in Fines, THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Apr. 6, 2010), 
http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2010/04/06/90370/massey-deadly-mine/?mobile=nc. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  See id. (stating that Massey has contested $1,128,833 in fines at UBB).  
 100.  Ken Ward, Jr., UMW Calls Massey Disaster “Industrial Homicide,” CHARLESTON 
GAZETTE (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.wvgazette.com/News/201110250214.  
 101.  J. DAVITT MCATEER AND ASSOCIATES, UPPER BIG BRANCH: THE APRIL 5, 2010, 
EXPLOSION: A FAILURE IN BASIC COAL MINE SAFETY PRACTICE 93 (2011), available at 
www.nttc.edu/ubb. 
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Energy, had only six fatalities during that period.102 This 
characterization gave solace to the survivors and deniability to the 
industry by making Massey the wholly culpable entity, but it ignored 
the fact that the rest of the mining industry also games the 
enforcement system in similar ways, thereby obscuring disasters-in-
the-making. For example, according to the House of Representatives 
Committee on Education and Labor, mine operators abuse the 
appeals process to delay compliance and boost revenues.103 The 
committee found that “blanket and indiscriminate” challenges have 
resulted in a backlog of 16,000 cases involving over $195 million in 
fines, allowing “irresponsible mine operators to avoid stiffer 
penalties.”104 
C. Regulatory Dysfunction 
In the absence of any credible industry-wide commitment to take 
the lessons of the Kingston spill to heart, our focus must shift to what 
government was doing to address the problem. Because the EPA 
does not regulate coal-ash surface impoundments, states provide the 
only oversight. The EPA’s evaluation of their performance reveals 
critical failures in key states.105 And the track record of state 
supervision at the Kingston TVA impoundment confirms this 
analysis. 
The Tennessee Department of Environmental Conservation 
(TDEC) had administered a permit program for surface 
impoundments at power plants since the 1980s, but the Kingston 
impoundment, which began receiving waste in the 1950s, was 
effectively grandfathered into the system. TVA did not file its first 
permit application for the dump site until the mid-1990s, and the 
TDEC did not issue a permit until 2000, after the impoundment walls 
were already nearly 60 feet high.106 TDEC then allowed TVA to raise 
 
 102.  Id.  
 103.  See generally Reducing the Growing Backlog of Contested Mine Safety Cases: Hearing 
Before the Comm. On Educ. And Labor, 111th Cong. (Feb. 23, 2010) (testimony of George 
Miller, Chairman), available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg54828/html/CHRG-
111hhrg54828.htm.  
 104.  Id. at 2. 
 105.  Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of Special 
Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128, 
35,150 (proposed June 21, 2010) (alluding to “a growing record of proven damage cases to 
groundwater and surface water, as well as a large number of potential damage cases” in many 
states). 
 106.   IDE III ET AL., supra note 1, at 4. 
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the walls another 20 feet, bringing its total height to 80 feet above the 
Emory River and 40 feet above an adjacent road.107 
TDEC conducted quarterly inspections at the Kingston 
impoundment. The inspections were limited to visual inspections that 
lasted about an hour. The inspector filled out a one-page inspection 
report consisting of a checklist and a small space for the inspector’s 
comments.108 The vast majority of the reports from 2002 through May 
2008 reported “no violations,” and those that did identify problems 
noted that TVA was adequately addressing them.109 The problems 
that TVA’s consultants identified in 2004 were also identifiable by 
TDEC inspectors during their quarterly inspections, but they 
consistently gave the ash-retention pond high marks for reasons that 
remain a mystery.110 
The history of the retention pond and the multiple post-spill 
investigations give no indication that state regulators had any impact 
whatsoever on how the facility was constructed, expanded, 
maintained, or operated. After the disaster, the governor’s advisory 
board recommended that TDEC promulgate more stringent 
regulations for such facilities.111 It urged TDEC to “focus on the need 
for guidelines or regulations that will improve life-cycle design 
requirements and related operational procedures for coal combustion 
waste [facilities]” and “require effective management oversight and 
thorough engineering design philosophy.”112 It recommended that the 
Tennessee legislature amend the Tennessee Safe Dams Act of 1973 to 
eliminate exemptions for wastewater-impoundment barriers. It also 
recommended that the legislature ensure that all dams with high or 
significant hazard were adequately regulated with respect to safety 
and stability.113 Although the advisory board did not specifically find 
that the TDEC program was inadequate, the extensive 
recommendations for improvement strongly suggest that it was not 
impressed with the existing arrangements. Ultimately, the Tennessee 
legislature enacted legislation prohibiting the state environmental 
 
    107.      Id. at 4–5. 
    108.    Id. at 12; see DIV. OF SOLID WASTE MGMT., TENN. DEP’T OF ENV’T AND 
CONSERVATION, SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL FACILITY EVALUATIONS (2008), available at 
http://web.knoxnews.com/pdf/123108tdec-inspection02-08.pdf.  
 109.  See DIV. OF SOLID WASTE MGMT., supra note 108. 
 110.  Marcum, supra note 70.  
 111.  TDEC LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 47.  
 112.  Id. at 6. In particular, it recommended that TDEC ban the “upstream staged 
construction” design that TVA used at the Kingston facility. Id. at 1–2.  
 113.  Id. at 17. 
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agency from issuing solid waste disposal permits for new or lateral 
expansions of existing coal-ash-disposal facilities if they did not 
provide for liners, proper closure, and caps.114 Unfortunately, this 
approach did nothing to resolve the national problem of decrepit 
coal-ash surface impoundments; it may even have had the effect of 
driving the disposal of Tennessee utilities’ wastes to other states. 
D. Kingston as Precedent 
In the wake of the Kingston spill, with EPA Administrator Lisa 
Jackson’s reconsideration of the EPA’s non-regulatory approach 
making the prospect of strong federal intervention seem possible for 
the first time, the electric-utility industry was at pains to distinguish 
the Kingston spill from any situation that might conceivably be 
addressed by new rules. “The solution isn’t simply to impose the most 
burdensome regulation on utilities whose customers would bear the 
brunt of the cost. In fact, regulating coal ash as hazardous would not 
have prevented the December 2008 spill at the nearby Kingston 
facility,” Dan Riedinger of Edison Electric Institute (EEI), the 
industry’s primary trade group, told EPA officials at a public hearing 
in Knoxville.115 “No one can downplay the tragedy of the Kingston 
impoundment failure,” agreed fellow witness Tom Schmaltz, 
environmental director of Headwaters Inc., which manufactures 
heavy construction materials, “but the Kingston impoundment failure 
and other cases cited are engineering failures. We must distinguish 
between engineering failures and the nature of a waste.”116 
Taken together, the two statements mask subtle contradictions. 
If, as Schmaltz suggested, the only requirement at stake was an EPA 
decision to attach a negative terminology to coal ash, he was right 
that TVA could have kept dumping slurry at Kingston with impunity 
and would certainly have ended up at the same place—with a 
disastrous and expensive spill on its hands that had not been 
prevented by the federal rules. On the other hand, why, as Riedinger 
suggested, would such “regulations” prove so “burdensome,” 
motivating such vociferous opposition, if all that was at stake was a 
label? 
 
 114.   Andrew M. Ballard, Legislature Approves Restrictions on Coal Mining, Coal Ash 
Disposal, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 1146 (May 15, 2009).  
 115.   EPA Hears Passionate Pleas on Both Sides of Coal Ash Regulation Issue, WBIR.COM 
(Oct. 27, 2010, 7:05 PM), http://www.wbir.com/rss/article/139934/2/EPA-hears-passionate-pleas-
on-both-sides-of-coal-ash-regulation-issue.    
     116.    Id.  
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In fact, the EPA’s original proposal, ultimately published as the 
strongest of three “options” in the rulemaking notice that emerged 
from a lengthy White House review process, would have required 
that all coal-ash disposal sites meet stringent construction and siting 
requirements117 that might well have prevented the Kingston spill had 
they been in effect when the dump was first opened several decades 
ago. As important, the stringent approach of treating coal ash as a 
hazardous waste under Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) would have given the EPA authority to 
require “corrective action” at old, unstable surface impoundments so 
long as those locations continued to receive new waste.118 And siting 
brand new facilities within a reasonable distance of coal-fired power 
plants is far easier said than done. In short, Reidinger was right the 
first time: new, more stringent rules would prove costly precisely 
because they would have required extensive retrofitting of old, 
unstable dumps that are vulnerable to the same engineering failures 
that caused the Kingston spill. 
Consider the following daunting statistics about existing surface 
impoundments. In the wake of the Kingston spill, the EPA undertook 
an investigation of existing surface impoundments’ integrity, finding 
that 109 of 584 such facilities nationwide had either a “high” or a 
“significant” hazard potential rating.119 In addition, 186 of the units 
were not designed by a professional engineer.120 Although the 
impoundments were designed to last for about 40 years, 56 were older 
than 50 years old and 360 were between 26 and 40 years old.121 
Moreover, 35 units at 25 facilities had already reported releases, 
ranging from minor spills to the massive release at the Kingston 
facility.122 Indeed, further scrutiny at the Kingston facility revealed 
significant safety deficiencies at a second site on its property.123 
 
    117.    See infra note 136. 
 118.  Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128, 35,133:  
EPA is proposing to list as a special waste, to be regulated under the RCRA 
subtitle C regulations, CCRs from electric utilities and independent power 
producers when destined for disposal in a landfill or surface impoundment. These 
CCRs would be regulated from the point of their generation to the point of their 
final disposition, including during and after closure of any disposal unit. This 
would include . . . corrective action, including facility-wide corrective action, 
closure of units, and post-closure care . . . . 
 119.  Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id.  
 122.  Id.  
 123.  Id. 
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TVA is a corporation owned by the U.S. government, supplying 
nine million customers, employing 12,000 people, ranking first among 
American utilities in energy sales and fifth in generating capacity, and 
serving Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
Tennessee, and Virginia.124 As a publicly-owned utility, TVA is 
immune from the pressures of share price and private investment. As 
a very large electric utility, TVA delivers a crucial product, the 
manufacture of which is subject to the same risks of catastrophic 
equipment and facility failure that confront its for-profit competitors. 
In other words, the dangerously myopic institutional culture revealed 
by the Kingston spill could easily plague other utilities, turning TVA 
from a “one off” rogue to an urgent example of bad things to come. 
III. THE RESPONSE: ONE STEP FORWARD AND TWO STEPS BACK 
A. The EPA Steps Forward 
To the great consternation of the electric-utility industry, the 
November 2008 election results seemed to change the political 
dynamic for regulating the environmental harm caused by power 
plants. As a young and apparently progressive president prepared to 
enter the Oval Office and the Democratic Party assumed control of 
both houses of Congress, the Kingston catastrophe raised the profile 
of coal-ash disposal, with national media filling the dead week 
between Christmas and New Year’s Day with images of inundated 
homes and a river covered with grey ooze. The stage was set for an 
unprecedented federal response to the root cause of the disaster. 
The Environmental Integrity Project, a prominent national 
environmental group, demanded that the EPA promulgate national 
regulations governing coal-ash disposal.125 Earthjustice, the premier 
litigating arm of the environmental movement, published a report 
entitled Waste Deep: Filling Mines with Coal Ash is Profit for 
Industry, but Poison for People, detailing the risks posed by dumping 
coal ash directly in abandoned mines.126 More than 100 environmental 
 
 124.   TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, http://www.tva.com/abouttva/index.htm (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2012).  
 125.   Charlotte E. Tucker, Earthjustice Calls on EPA to Regulate Mine Storage, Disposal of 
Coal-Ash Waste, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 171 (Jan. 23, 2009). 
 126.   EARTHJUSTICE, WASTE DEEP: FILLING MINES WITH COAL ASH IS PROFIT FOR 
INDUSTRY, BUT POISON FOR PEOPLE (2009), available at http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/ 
files/library/reports/earthjustice_waste_deep.pdf. In 2008, EPA estimated that approximately 
eight percent of the 136 million tons of coal ash generated that year was dumped into 
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organizations signed a letter to newly appointed EPA Administrator 
Lisa Jackson urging her to “chart a new, responsible course” for 
regulating CCRs.127 
Jackson was receptive. Calling the Kingston spill “one of the 
largest and most serious environmental releases in our history,”128 she 
announced on March 9, 2009 that her agency was in the process of 
developing regulations for coal-ash disposal.129 These regulations 
would address the serious problem of unstable surface 
impoundments.130 To build a record in support of a protective 
proposal, the EPA sent information requests to 150 power plants 
owned by more than fifty utilities seeking data on the structural 
integrity of those units.131 Agency officials said they hoped to publish 
a proposed rule by the end of the year.132 
The Kingston catastrophe also generated a great deal of activity 
in Congress, which held no fewer than six hearings on the causes of 
the spill, the nature and scope of the coal ash disposal problem, and 
methods of preventing a recurrence.133 Several members urged the 
EPA to regulate disposal under RCRA, the premier federal waste 
 
abandoned mine shafts.  Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128, 
35,151. 
 127.  Charlotte E. Tucker, Advocacy Groups Ask EPA to Take Lead on Regulating Coal-
Combustion Waste, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 494 (Mar. 6, 2009). 
 128.   Janice Valverde, Tennessee Valley Authority, EPA Agree on $950 Million Cleanup of 
Coal Ash Spill, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 1116 (May 15, 2009). 
 129.   Charlotte E. Tucker, EPA to Propose Coal-Ash Rule by Year's End, Asks Utilities For 
Data on Ash Impoundments, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 552 (Mar. 13, 2009). 
 130.   Coal Combustion Byproducts: Potential Impact of a Hazardous Waste Designation on 
Small Businesses in the Recycling Industry, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Rural Dev., 
Entrepreneurship and Trade of the House Small Business Committee, 111th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(2010) (testimony of Lisa Felt, EPA); Charlotte E. Tucker, EPA Says Balance Needed Between 
Handling of Coal Combustion Waste, Beneficial Reuse, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 1064 
(May 8, 2009).  
 131.   Tucker, supra note 125. 
 132.   Id.  
 133.   Ash Spill Causes Hearing, supra note 14; Coal Combustion Byproducts: Potential 
Impact of a Hazardous Waste Designation on Small Businesses in the Recycling Industry, 
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Rural Dev., Entrepreneurship and Trade of the House 
Small Business Committee,  supra note 14; Coal Combustion Waste Storage and Water Quality, 
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Water Resources and the Environment of the House 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, supra note 14; The Tennessee Valley 
Authority’s Kingston Ash Slide: Potential Water Quality Impacts of Coal Combustion Waste 
Storage, Hearings Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,  supra note 
14; Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources of the House Committee 
on Natural Resources, supra note 14; Oversight Hearing on the Tennessee Valley Authority and 
the Recent Major Coal Ash Spill, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Environment and 
Public Works,  supra note 14. 
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disposal statute.134 Congressman Nick Rahall (D-WV), the chairman 
of the House Natural Resources Committee, introduced a bill that 
would have required the Department of the Interior to promulgate 
regulations containing federally enforceable requirements for the 
storage and disposal of CCRs.135 
In October 2009, the EPA sent the draft of a proposed rule to 
Cass Sunstein, the White House “regulatory czar,” known more 
formally as the administrator of the Office of Management and 
Budget’s (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA).136 That document, referred to here as the “Original EPA 
Proposal,” stated the agency’s intention to regulate coal ash as a 
hazardous waste under Subtitle C of RCRA.137 The draft preamble to 
the proposal cited two distinct categories of harm that justified 
imposing stringent federal controls on disposal: (1) the migration of 
toxic constituents of the ash into the environment, especially 
groundwater; and (2) the probable recurrence of spills like the one in 
Kingston.138 In keeping with the theme of responses to disasters, we 
 
 134.   See Charlotte E. Tucker, EPA Pledge to Regulate Coal Ash Leads Rahal to Abandon 
Interior Legislation, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 552 (Mar. 13, 2009) (Rep. Nick Rahall 
urges EPA to promulgate CCR regulations under RCRA); Charlotte E. Tucker, Coal Ash 
Regulation May Need to Change, TVA President Testifies at Senate Hearing, 40 ENV'T REP. 
CUR. DEV. (BNA) 108 (Jan. 16, 2009) (Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.) wants “to know what 
the EPA is doing to protect the public from the hazards of these toxic coal ash ponds”); Steven 
D. Cook & Linda Roeder, Jackson Pledges Review of EPA Policies But Avoids Specifics on 
Possible Changes, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 122 (Jan. 16, 2009) (Sen. Barbara Boxer 
(D. Cal.) urges EPA to regulate CCR wastes under RCRA). 
 135.   Charlotte E. Tucker, Bill Would Require Coal Combustion Waste Regulation Under 
Surface Mining Control Act, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 171 (Jan. 23, 2009). 
     136.    The EPA has posted two versions of its draft proposal for regulation concerning the 
disposal of coal combustion residuals from electric utilities, hazardous substance designation, 
and reportable quantities of residuals. For the original draft, see ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM; IDENTIFICATION AND LISTING OF HAZARDOUS 
WASTE; DISPOSAL OF COAL COMBUSTION RESIDUALS FROM ELECTRIC UTILITIES AND 
CERCLA HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE DESIGNATION AND REPORTABLE QUANTITIES (Oct. 16, 
2009), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-RCRA-2009-
0640-0013 [hereinafter ORIGINAL EPA PROPOSAL]. The second version includes red-lining 
incorporated during reviews by and negotiations with OIRA. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM; IDENTIFICATION AND LISTING OF HAZARDOUS 
WASTE; DISPOSAL OF COAL COMBUSTION RESIDUALS FROM ELECTRIC UTILITIES AND 
CERCLA HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE DESIGNATION AND REPORTABLE QUANTITIES (May 3, 
2009), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-RCRA-2009-
0640-0012. The two versions of the draft proposal are available in an online docket of federal 
regulation material. Docket on Coal Ash, REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov 
/#!docketDetail;D=EPA-HQ-RCRA-2009-0640 (last visited Sept. 30, 2012) [hereinafter Docket 
on Coal Ash].  
 137.   Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921–6939f (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  
     138.     See ORIGINAL EPA PROPOSAL, supra note 136, at 62. 
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focus here only on the second threat. Indeed, we must confess that we 
have never fully understood the de-emphasis of potentially massive 
structural failures by the national environmental community.139 
Although the pollution of groundwater by coal-ash facilities poses 
potentially serious, long-term risks, it represents a more attenuated 
threat to public health than massive spills. Moreover, the 
groundwater threat is difficult to quantify without extensive 
investigation that requires the installation of expensive monitoring 
equipment and complicated modeling of the movement of plumes of 
contamination within aquifers. In contrast, images of Kingston in the 
aftermath of the spill, a mere two clicks away on YouTube, are easy 
to understand and quite disturbing.140 
The EPA’s original proposal would have profoundly changed 
existing disposal practices. The owners and operators of coal-fired 
power plants could no longer have kept sludge in open, unlined pits in 
the ground, but would instead have been required to send the ash to 
landfills and surface impoundments that met far more protective 
design requirements, including the installation of liners, impermeable 
(rain-proof) covers, and leachate-detection systems.141 The EPA 
would have been responsible for determining those design standards, 
although state regulators would have remained responsible for 
enforcing individual facility permits in most places.142 Federal and 
state regulators would have had the authority to compel “corrective 
action” at existing coal ash impoundments where outmoded designs, 
imprudent engineering, geography, or other factors created a hazard 
to public health or the environment.143 
Yet these changes (and their admittedly steep costs) were not the 
frame of reference selected by electric utilities and their allies for a 
well-funded, politically shrewd, and, in the end, extraordinarily 
effective campaign against the EPA initiative. Had the utilities 
 
 139.  Earthjustice and the Environmental Integrity Project, the two most active groups, have 
consistently emphasized groundwater contamination. See, e.g., JEFF STANT, EARTHJUSTICE, 
ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT & SIERRA CLUB, IN HARM’S WAY: LACK OF FEDERAL COAL 
ASH REGULATIONS ENDANGERS AMERICANS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT (2010), available at 
http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/files/report-in-harms-way.pdf. 
 140.  See, e.g., Mountain Justice, TVA Coal Ash Disaster, YOUTUBE.COM (Dec. 23, 2008), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rGmVCABMRRQ; VidXPress, TVA Coal Ash Spill in 
Kingston, TN, YOUTUBE.COM (July 22, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=dO9k7gMObe8.  
 141.  See ORIGINAL EPA PROPOSAL, supra note 136, at 311–12. 
 142.  Id. at 236–37. 
 143.  Id. at 61–62. 
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complained about disposal costs, not only would they have isolated 
themselves, they would have focused attention on the state of ill-
repair of existing facilities, inevitably drawing a stark contrast 
between huge open pits like the one TVA operated in Kingston and 
the new, better-engineered facilities required by the EPA’s proposal. 
Instead, the utilities recruited an unusually broad cross-section of 
industry groups to argue that the EPA’s proposal would discourage 
the beneficial reuse of coal ash with devastating economic 
consequences.144 The coalition of opponents included companies using 
the ash to make concrete and wallboard, as well as large construction 
companies using it to line roadbeds.145 They offered to accept further 
regulatory controls on coal-ash disposal, but only if the content and 
implementation of those requirements were left to the discretion of 
individual states—a state of affairs that was in essence the status 
quo.146 
The EPA estimated that about 37 percent of the 136 million tons 
of coal ash generated—or about 50.1 million tons—was beneficially 
reused in 2008.147 Because the agency’s rulemaking proposal explicitly 
exempted any and all coal ash subject to “beneficial reuse”—a wide-
open category of purposes that the EPA has not yet defined—
opponents were compelled to make a more elaborate argument.148 
They contended that because coal ash would be labeled a hazardous 
waste when discarded, recycled coal ash would pick up a “stigma” in 
the marketplace.149 People would be afraid to buy it for any purpose 
because someday they might be sued for using it. No one ever 
explained how consumers would discover that coal ash lay in a road 
bed or within a piece of wallboard, much less how individuals would 
be able to successfully sue manufacturers or construction companies 
for tangible harm so long as the toxic elements of the ash remained 
encapsulated. And, of course, if toxic elements could escape from 
 
 144.    Charlotte E. Tucker, As EPA Plans on Coal Ash, Industry Cautions Against Sweeping 
Change, 40 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 552 (2009). 
 145.    Janice Valverde, Coal Ash Comments Number Over 200,000; Industry, 
Environmentalists Sharply Disagree, 41 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 2931 (2010).  
 146.    Utility Industry to EPA: Please Regulate Coal Ash, POLLUTION ENGINEERING, June 
1, 2009, at 9 (stating that groups “would welcome additional oversight” if coal was regulated as a 
non-hazardous waste. Non-hazardous wastes are regulated under the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 
which establishes minimum federal guidelines for state-implemented and designed plans. See 42 
U.S.C. §§ 6941–6947 (1984).). 
 147.     Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128, 35,151. 
 148.     Id. at 35,160.  
    149.    Avery Fellow, EPA Must Consider Beneficial Use Data In Coal Ash Final Rule, 
Industry Groups Say, 42 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 2694 (2011).  
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such products, the coal ash would have been re-used, but not 
beneficially. 
B. The White House Steps Back 
1. Centralized Review in Practice 
When the EPA did not retreat in the face of the industry 
coalition’s spirited opposition, business groups took their objections 
to OIRA, the obscure but extraordinarily powerful White House unit 
that Harvard Law School Dean Martha Minow once called “an office 
that most people have never heard of.”150 OIRA is responsible for a 
potent system of centralized White House review of regulatory 
proposals from all the agencies and departments in the Executive 
Branch. 
White House regulatory oversight began at the same time that 
Congress passed a wide variety of progressive laws protecting 
consumers, workers, and breathers from fraud, safety hazards on the 
job, and pollution. With the notable exception of the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA),151 the most important health, safety, and 
environmental agencies were created during an extraordinary period 
of law reform in the early 1970’s that was driven by young people’s 
protests against the Vietnam War and their parents’ concern that, in 
the absence of a revitalized government, baby boomers would remain 
perpetually alienated from their country.152 The industries brought 
under the ambit of these ambitious new regulatory regimes 
successfully demanded that White House allies of a more 
conservative bent ride herd over the reformers in the regulatory 
agencies. From the beginning, as Professor Robert Percival has noted, 
 
 150.  Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 994, 994 (2001) (referring to Harvard Law 
School Dean Martha Minow’s introduction of Sunstein on March 1, 2010). For a more complete 
exploration of the extraordinary influence of centralized White House review in shaping health, 
safety, and environmental regulation over four decades, see Steinzor, supra note 23. 
 151.  The FDA was created in 1906 in response to fraud surrounding the marketing of 
ineffective and even dangerous remedies. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, repealed 
by Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 902(a), 52 Stat. 1040, 1059 (1938); James 
Harvey Young, The Medical Messiahs: A Social History of Health Quackery in Twentieth 
Century America, 160 SCI. 643, 644 (1968). 
 152.  Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 199 (1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. App. at 
643 (2006), and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970) (establishing EPA); Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. 
L. No. 92–573, § 4(a), 86 Stat. 1207, 1210 (1972) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) 
(2006)) (establishing CPSC); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–596, 
84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2006)) (establishing OSHA); Highway 
Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–605, § 202, 84 Stat. 1714, 1739 (codified as amended at 49 
U.S.C. § 105 (2006)) (establishing NHTSA). 
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the distinctive strategy for the regulated industries was the “inside 
game,” negotiating behind closed doors for the changes they desired, 
while environmentalists, consumer groups, and organized labor went 
“outside” to reformers in Congress, publicizing the human costs of 
the corporate malfeasance they wanted to address.153 
As the ink was drying on the landmark reforms of the early 
1970’s, the Nixon Administration’s Secretary of Commerce, Maurice 
Stans, persuaded chief domestic policy advisor John Ehrlichman to 
establish a taskforce to oversee the EPA’s regulatory activities.154 This 
type of oversight continued throughout the 1970’s, embraced by 
Democratic President Jimmy Carter, who appointed his budget 
director Bert Lance to spearhead those efforts.155 At the close of the 
Carter Administration, Congress passed two statutes that codified the 
White House’s regulatory role: the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the 
Paperwork Reduction Act; the second statute established OIRA.156 
The new office was assigned to review any proposal by a government 
agency or department to compel individual citizens, private sector 
entities, and state and local governments to fill out new paperwork.157 
As President Ronald Reagan entered office intent on rolling back 
regulation, OIRA was available to implement new protocols. 
Executive Order (EO) 12,291,158 issued shortly after the Reagan 
Administration took office, contained the following trio of no-
nonsense instructions: 
1.   All covered agencies159 must refrain from taking action unless 
potential benefits outweigh potential costs.160 The agencies 
 
 153.   See Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the 
Environmental Protection Agency, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 134–38 (1991). 
 154.   See id. at 132–33. 
 155.   See id. at 142.  
 156.   Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96–354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (2006)); Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–511, 
94 Stat. 2812 (1980) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3520 (2006)). 
 157.   Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–511, 94 Stat. 2812, 2814–15 (1980) 
(codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3520 (2006)). 
 158.   Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982). 
 159.   The order—and all subsequent regulatory review orders—exempt independent 
regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, but covers all Cabinet departments and free-standing executive branch agencies 
such as EPA. See Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, OIRA Adm’r., to the Heads of Indep. 
Regulatory Agencies (July 22, 2011) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/omb/memorandum/2011/m11-28.pdf. 
 160.  Exec. Order 12,291, §2(b), 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981).  
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must also consider regulatory alternatives that involve the 
lowest net cost.161 
2.   Agencies must prepare a “regulatory impact analysis” (RIA) 
containing their cost-benefit analysis for each “major” rule, 
defined to include any proposal that would have an annual 
effect on the economy of $100 million or more.162 
3.   Agencies must send a copy of each proposed and final rule to 
OIRA before it is published in the Federal Register.163 
Agencies must respond to any concerns raised by OIRA 
staff.164 
The Reagan Administration spent a great deal of time and 
political capital fighting with congressional reformers, especially the 
generation of bright, young, liberal congressmen elected in the 
immediate aftermath of Watergate. Henry Waxman (D-CA) and 
subcommittee chairman on the powerful House Energy and 
Commerce Committee, James Florio (D-NJ), took the lead in 
resisting deregulation, especially in the context of environmental 
protection.165 OIRA was at the forefront of these controversies. 
George H.W. Bush continued in the direction set by Reagan, albeit 
with considerably less sturm und drang.166 The Democrats’ return to 
the presidency with the election of Bill Clinton assuaged 
congressional Democrats’ opposition to OIRA, in part because the 
new administration replaced the Reagan executive orders with an 
apparently more moderate set of procedures.167 
The new Clinton EO 12,866, which persists to this day, 
authorizes OIRA to review “significant” rules (such as requirements 
that would impose economic effects over $100 million annually or 
“adversely affect” the economy “in a material way”).168 But it imposes 
 
 161.  Id. § 3(d)(4). 
 162.  Id. §§ 1(b)(1), 3(d)(4). 
 163.  Id. § 3(c). 
 164.  Id. § 3(f)(2). 
 165.  For a vivid description of these events, see David Osborne, State of Siege: Can 
Democrats Mastermind the Great Escape?, MOTHER JONES, Feb.–Mar. 1982, at 22, 22–31. 
Professor Steinzor worked for Representative Florio at that time as staff counsel to the 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee that he chaired, and they worked closely with Representative Waxman’s 
Subcommittee on Health.  
 166.  Steinzor, supra note 23, at 245.  
 167.  Id. at 245–47.  
 168.  Exec. Order No. 12,866, §§ 3(f)(1), 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994). 
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a series of mandatory deadlines for the conclusion of review169 and 
instructs OIRA to “make available to the public” all documents that 
it sent back and forth to the rulemaking agency or department.170 
These “before-and-after” documents allow stakeholders to track 
changes that are made during the review process. President Clinton 
continued the use of cost-benefit analysis.171 As a practical matter, 
OIRA kept a far lower profile during the Clinton Administration; it 
stayed out of the media and sharply decreased its workload, 
reviewing between 500 and 700 rules annually in contrast to 2,000 and 
3,000 under Reagan and Bush.172 But President Clinton’s enthusiasm 
for a strong OIRA presence made it a bipartisan institution, 
entrenching centralized White House regulatory review. 
Under President George W. Bush, OIRA returned to the 
aggressive Reagan model. The new President shrewdly retained 
Executive Order 12,866, creating the appearance that he was merely 
continuing a long-standing tradition. But OIRA returned with 
enthusiasm to its higher profile “gatekeeper” role.173 Under the 
leadership of John Graham (2001–2006) and Susan Dudley (2006–
2009), OIRA significantly increased the number of “return letters” it 
sent to the agencies, demanding that they reconsider regulatory 
proposals.174 Economic analysis became the critical factor in deciding 
the content of rules, especially in the environmental arena where 
most were statutorily mandated, with deadlines for their 
production.175 Graham rewrote OIRA’s guidance regarding the 
methodologies agencies must use to conduct cost-benefit analysis to 
make them far more elaborate.176 
The other Bush II Administration change was OIRA’s energetic 
assertion of jurisdiction over science policy. John Graham realized 
that the justification for many of the health, safety, and 
 
 169.    Id. § 6(b)(2). 
 170.    Id. § 6(b)(4)(D). 
 171.    Id. § 6(a). 
    172.  See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32397, FEDERAL 
RULEMAKING: THE ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS 10 
(2009).  
 173.    Id. at 19.  
 174.    Id.  
 175.    For a more detailed description of these events, see Steinzor, supra note 23, at 247–54. 
 176.    Compare OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL 
REGULATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 (1996), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/inforeg/riaguide.html, with OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
CIRCULAR A–4 (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4/. 
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environmental regulations that economists considered to be 
inefficient arose from the “precautionary principle,” which holds that 
government should not wait for scientific certainty to take action to 
control emerging threats.177 By challenging the protective assumptions 
government scientists had been making during the process of 
assessing risk, Graham and his staff hoped to curtail regulation 
without admitting that they were making policy decisions to take a 
less rigorous approach toward emerging threats. Their efforts had 
mixed results: OIRA intruded on all aspects of rulemaking with 
impunity, but its effort to adopt government-wide guidance specifying 
how agencies and departments should perform risk assessments was 
repudiated by the National Academies of Science, among other 
critics.178 Nevertheless, as the Bush II Administration trailed to a 
close, OIRA was once again in the prominent, albeit controversial 
role of riding herd on the agencies and departments—especially the 
EPA—as those proposals were developed. 
During his first presidential campaign, Barack Obama defined 
the role of government as helping people when they cannot help 
themselves, allowing progressives to hope that he would advocate 
strong policies to reverse the deregulatory neglect of the Bush II 
years.179 The newly elected President sent signals at the outset of his 
Administration that he would implement such changes, selecting a 
roster of experienced and well-respected appointees to head the 
health, safety, and environmental agencies, especially Lisa Jackson at 
the EPA. But the President’s enthusiasm waned as seemingly more 
urgent problems competed for his attention. He did not fight for 
badly needed increases in the EPA’s deflated budget nor did he 
support his appointees when they were attacked by Republicans and 
conservative Democrats.180 Most disturbing, he showed no enthusiasm 
 
 177.   See, e.g., David Kriebel et al., The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Science, 
109 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 871, 871–72 (2001).  
 178.   Steinzor, supra note 23, at 249–51.  
 179.   See, e.g., Barack Obama, President, Closing Argument Speech at the Canton 
Memorial Civic Center (Oct. 27, 2008) (transcript available at 
http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/2008/10/obama_closing_argument_speech_1.html). 
 180.   Modest increases in some agency budgets were proposed but were quickly eclipsed by 
deficit politics, with the President hastening to make deals with Republicans and paving the way 
for deep cuts in the funding available to implement those protections. See, e.g., Jim Efstathiou, 
EPA Budget Cut Will Restrict Enforcement of Clean-Air Rules, Activists Say, BLOOMBERG.COM 
(Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-12/epa-budget-cut-will-restrict-
enforcement-of-clean-air-rules-activists-say.html. The President has not defended the mission of 
the agencies or the performance of the people he appointed to lead them in the face of 
blistering Republican attacks on alleged overregulation, except in the context of explaining how 
McGarity 12.17 (Do Not Delete) 12/17/2012  2:51 PM 
122 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 23:93 
for updating the outmoded laws that crippled agency efforts to curtail 
chronic violations.181 
The President’s ambivalence towards these agencies was 
crystallized in his appointment of Harvard Law School professor Cass 
Sunstein as OIRA Administrator. Sunstein was well-known in 
academic circles as a critic of the precautionary principle and a 
supporter of quantitative cost-benefit analysis.182 Business groups and 
conservative commentators hailed his appointment.183 And it was easy 
to see why. In the aftermath of the 2010 midterm elections, with 
radical conservatives in the House of Representatives launching the 
most withering campaign against the regulatory system since Newt 
Gingrich’s 104th Congress, Sunstein helped President Obama pivot to 
a new strategy that attempted to deflect the accusation that his 
Administration was hostile to business by launching his own version 
of a regulatory witch-hunt. 
 
far he is willing to go to eliminate unnecessarily burdensome regulations. See, e.g., Alan Fram, 
Obama’s Push to Revamp Regulations, WASH. POST, May 30, 2011, at A21 (“Overall, the drive 
would save hundreds of millions of dollars annually for companies, governments and individuals 
and eliminate millions of hours of paperwork while maintaining health and safety protections 
for Americans, White House officials said.”).  
 181.  The President was missing in action during congressional debate regarding legislation 
to strengthen regulation of deepwater oil production and mine safety. This approach was 
emblematic of the administration’s reluctance to put much political capital on the line in the 
health, safety, and environmental arenas. See, e.g., Vicki Smith, MSHA to Congress: Mine Safety 
Laws Need to Be Stronger, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2011/03/03/msha-congress-minesafety_n_830841.html (“MSHA chief Joe Main . . . told the 
chairman, Republican Rep. Tim Walberg of Michigan, he was not recommending any particular 
legislation.”). 
 182.  See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE (2005). Laws of Fear is an attack on the precautionary principle, which Sunstein 
describes as “literally incoherent” in “its strongest forms.” Id. at 4. He explains that the strong 
form of this principle requires regulation “whenever there is a possible risk to health, safety, or 
the environment, even if the supporting evidence remains speculative and even if the economic 
costs of regulation are high.” Id. at 24. He contends that powerful and irrational social forces 
feed average citizens’ overreaction to risk. Because non-experts have difficulty factoring in the 
probability that a risk would occur and instead panic in response to harm that has a very small 
chance of occurring, “the public’s demand for government intervention can be greatly affected 
by probability neglect, so that regulators may end up engaging in extensive regulation precisely 
because intense emotional reactions are making people relatively insensitive to the (low) 
probability that dangers will ever come to fruition.” Id. at 69. Sunstein sees these reactions as so 
extreme that he recommends keeping the public from influencing government decisions that 
involve such risks: “[T]here is [a risk that] high levels of public participation in technical 
domains [will] simply heighten public fear, with unfortunate consequences for policy.” Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1161 (2002) (reviewing PAUL SLOVIC, 
THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000)). 
 183.  See, e.g., David Frum, Is the Right Still Afraid of Cass Sunstein?, FRUMFORUM.COM 
(May 26, 2011, 8:48 AM), http://www.frumforum.com/is-the-right-still-afraid-of-cass-sunstein/.  
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In January 2011, President Obama took the unusual step of 
publishing a Wall Street Journal column pledging to establish a “21st-
century” system that would eliminate “dumb” rules and avoid 
“excessive, inconsistent, and redundant regulation.”184 New EO 13,563 
followed on the heels of this pronouncement, directing agencies to 
develop plans for identifying “outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or 
excessively burdensome” rules and “to modify, streamline, expand, or 
repeal them.”185 The President reiterated these instructions in a 
second EO a year later, further ordering agencies to move to the 
front of the line any new rules that would reduce “cumulative” 
regulatory burdens on a given industrial sector.186 Supervised closely 
by OIRA administrator Sunstein, the agencies struggled to find 
poster children for overregulation that, once identified and 
publicized, would have the effect of admitting that the originating 
agency had done some very stupid things in the past.187 Ironically, 
despite the significant impact these initiatives had on slowing the 
Obama Administration’s rulemaking efforts,188 conservative critics on 
Capitol Hill and in the business community gave President Obama no 
 
 184.  Barack Obama, Op-Ed., Toward a 21st-Century Regulatory System, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
18, 2011, at A17; see also Cass Sunstein, Op-Ed., 21st-Century Regulation: An Update on the 
President’s Reforms, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2011, at A17. 
 185.  Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821–22 (Jan. 18, 2011). 
 186.  Exec. Order No. 13,610, 77 Fed. Reg. 28,469 (May 14, 2012).  
 187.  One excellent example of this pitiable yet damaging syndrome is the President’s 2012 
State of the Union address that ridiculed an EPA “rule” requiring farmers to have a spill 
prevention plan for large tanks containing milk. Barack Obama, President, State of the Union 
Address (Jan. 24, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24 
/remarks-president-state-union-address. Typically, such plans are required at facilities storing 
potentially hazardous substances like crude oil so that if the tank fractures, the spill is contained 
and does not run into rivers and streams. Milk was covered because in large quantities it could 
harm water quality, although the EPA never enforced the rule and ultimately decided to 
exempt the tanks because they were already required to be carefully monitored under 
Department of Agriculture regulations. Regardless, the President gave people watching the 
speech yet another reason to disdain regulations and regulatory agencies. See Cary Coglianese, 
Taking Regulation Seriously, REGBLOG (Jan. 28, 2012), https://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/ 
regblog/2012/01/taking-regulation-seriously.html.  
 188.  For analyses of this slowdown, see generally AMY SINDEN, ET AL., CTR. FOR 
PROGRESSIVE REFORM, TWELVE CRUCIAL HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATIONS: WILL THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION FINISH ON TIME? (2011), available at 
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/12Rules_1106.pdf; RENA STEINZOR & JAMES 
GOODWIN, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, OPPORTUNITY WASTED: THE OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATION'S FAILURE TO ADOPT NEEDED REGULATORY SAFEGUARDS IN A TIMELY 
WAY IS COSTING LIVES AND MONEY (2012), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/ 
12RulesIssueBrief.cfm.  
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credit whatsoever for blunting the impact of “job killing” 
regulation.189 
2. Coal Ash Protections and the “Stigma Effect” 
Despite the impression created by its broad jurisdiction and 
aggressive assertions of control over regulatory policy, OIRA is a 
small office, with about three dozen “desk officers” and “branch 
chiefs” responsible for reviewing some 700 regulatory matters 
annually.190 OIRA reviews both proposed and final rules, and given 
the complexity of many of these rules, its career employees use what 
is best described as deterrence-based review: they single out a handful 
of controversial rules for well-publicized attention, thereby signaling 
that agencies better have covered all their cost-benefit bases and 
placated their most committed industry foes long before their 
paperwork hits the economists’ desks. Coal ash is a prominent 
example of this strategy. 
Almost as soon as rumors of the EPA’s ambitious proposal to 
declare coal ash a hazardous waste under Subtitle C of RCRA hit K 
Street, the de facto headquarters of the capitol’s business lobbyists, 
opponents initiated an unprecedented siege on OIRA, demanding 
help in suppressing Jackson and her staff.191 OIRA staff sat through 
forty-seven separate meetings with organizational representatives 
interested in the EPA proposal, an especially egregious number given 
the ample opportunities that interested parties already had to explain 
their reasoned, evidence-based opposition to the EPA in a 
rulemaking record posted on the worldwide web.192 Two-thirds of 
these meetings involved industry and state representatives opposing 
the rule, while the remainder involved environmental groups 
supporting it.193 
 
 189.  See Andrew Zajac, Agencies Told to Weigh Effects of Business Rules in the U.S., 
BLOOMBERG.COM (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-20/agencies-told-
to-weigh-effects-of-business-rules-in-u-s-.html (“The top regulatory official at the Washington-
based U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the nation’s largest business-lobbying group, said Sunstein’s 
office hasn’t listened to the group’s complaints about redundant rules.”).  
 190.  COPELAND, supra note 172, at 28.  
 191.  For a detailed description of these events, see Steinzor, supra note 23, at 260–68. 
     192.    See James Goodwin, Eye on OIRA: Coal Ash Meetings Up to 42, CPR BLOG (Apr. 5, 
2010, 11:12 AM), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=CE877002-A1A5-
ADAC-34017AC4184F218A; see also Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Solid Waste and Emergency 
Response: Meeting Records, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira_2050_meetings/. 
 193.  See Goodwin, supra note 192; see also Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 192. 
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At least as troubling as this relentless lobbying blitz was TVA’s 
involvement as a well-protected “interagency” stakeholder. Needless 
to say, it also opposed the rule, joined by its colleagues at the 
Department of Transportation, which spoke from its perspective as a 
builder of highways using recycled coal ash, and the Department of 
Energy, which stood up for electric utilities that own and operate 
coal-fired power plants, one of its most important constituencies. All 
three submitted informal comments trashing the EPA proposal to 
OIRA, which wrote them up as confidential “interagency” 
communications in direct contravention of the disclosure 
requirements of EO 12,866.194 When EPA staff posted the interagency 
comments on its web-based rulemaking docket, a power struggle 
ensued; the document was briefly pulled off the web but then restored 
with a notation that such a brazen disclosure mistake would never 
happen again.195 As Professor Steinzor has written previously, federal 
opponents of the coal ash proposal took on the features of a posse in 
a classic western, riding to support the OIRA sheriff’s pursuit of the 
outlaw EPA.196 
OIRA held onto the coal ash rule for seven months—well 
beyond the ninety-day review period allotted under EO 12,866—
while it rewrote both the rulemaking notice and the EPA’s regulatory 
impact statement.197 Finally, in May 2010, a fundamentally different 
rulemaking notice emerged from OIRA, advancing three alternatives: 
(1) EPA’s original option that coal ash be regulated as a RCRA 
Subtitle C hazardous waste; (2) an approach that would treat coal ash 
as a “solid” waste under RCRA Subtitle D when it is disposed on 
land, essentially leaving all regulatory decisions and enforcement to 
state discretion; and (3) a so-called “D prime” option that would 
allow all existing coal ash disposal landfills and surface 
impoundments to continue to function without change for the 
remainder of their useful lives.198 
 
 194.   See EPA, Interagency Working Comments on Draft Rule Under EO 12866, at 1 
(noting that these entities were contributors to the confidential process of commenting on draft 
rules), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-RCRA-2009-
0640-0350. 
 195.   For a more detailed description of this incident, see Steinzor, supra note 23, at 264. 
 196.   Id. at 265. 
 197.   See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921–6939f. 
 198.   The Federal Register notice setting forth these options only admits to two 
alternatives, although it explicitly raises the third, minimally protective proposal, calling it the 
“[subtitle] ‘D prime’ ” approach. 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128, 35,134 (June 21, 2010).  
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We are convinced that raw political considerations lie at the 
heart of this decision to back away from the EPA’s protective 
approach, thereby muddying the waters on the final outcome and 
sending the signal that the most stringent alternative was in deep 
trouble. OIRA, however, invented an elaborate rationale for these 
changes that invoked what has been one of Administrator Sunstein’s 
central interests during his academic career—behavioral economics, 
or the semi-scientific study of why people do not always appear to 
behave as rational actors in certain decision-making contexts. As 
applied to regulation, behavioral economists attempt to overcome 
people’s irrational preferences, or “heuristics,” through various 
techniques that often trump direct government efforts to curb 
harmful industrial activities.199 As mentioned earlier, electric utilities 
and their allies in the coal and construction industries focused their 
opposition to the EPA proposal on the notion that it would create a 
“stigma effect” that would destroy the recycling market because 
consumers of the products containing the ash would be deterred from 
buying the material by its designation as a hazardous waste when it 
was simply disposed of in regulated landfills.200 As a result of the 
stigma effect, electric utilities would be compelled to pay significantly 
higher costs for disposal and their customers that now recycled coal 
 
 199.   The benign version of Sunstein’s preoccupation with this field is the book he wrote 
with Richard Thaler entitled Nudge, which argues that the government should exercise benign 
paternalism by giving people options that are presented in a manner that overcomes their 
natural tendencies to make the worst choices. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (2009). A 
considerably darker version of this theory, which attributes much of the protective 
environmental legislation enacted into law over the past three decades as unacceptably costly 
because people are irrationally afraid of toxic exposures, is presented in Sunstein’s book, Laws 
of Fear, published in 2005. SUNSTEIN, supra note 182. For example, Sunstein excoriates 
residents of the Washington D.C. metropolitan area who tried desperately to stay out of the 
path of the snipers who killed ten people in a rampage during the fall of 2002: 
But there is something very odd about the extraordinary effects of the snipers’ actions. 
For people in the area, the snipers caused a miniscule increase in risk. About 5 million 
people live in that area. If the snipers were going to kill one person every three days, 
the daily statistical risk was less than one in one million, and the weekly statistical risk 
was less than three in one million. These are trivial risks, far lower than the risks 
associated with many daily activities about which people do not express even the 
slightest concern. The daily risk was smaller than the one in one million risk from 
drinking 30 diet sodas with saccharin, driving 100 miles, smoking two cigarettes, taking 
ten airplane trips, living in a home with a smoker for two weeks, living in Denver 
rather than Philadelphia for 40 days, and eating 35 slices of fresh bread. 
Id. at 90–91. 
 200.  See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR EPA’S PROPOSED RCRA 
REGULATION OF COAL COMBUSTION RESIDUES (CCR) GENERATED BY THE ELECTRIC 
UTILITY INDUSTRY 10–12 (2010), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail; 
D=EPA-HQ-RCRA-2009-0640-0003. 
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ash would stop doing so and would instead be compelled to pay more 
for virgin materials.201 
OIRA’s calculations of stigma costs in the Final Draft RIA came 
out to a whopping $233.5 billion in negative, or lost, economic and 
environmental benefits at the high end of its range of estimates.202 The 
calculations assumed that if the strict EPA rule went into effect, 
approximately fifty-one percent of coal ash that is now recycled—
some thirty-seven million tons—would be diverted to disposal in 
2012, growing to about forty-one million tons annually by 2061.203 The 
fifty-one percent assumption was never justified, and seemed at best 
to be a stab in the dark. But this potentially enormous price tag was 
extraordinary as these things go, and it hung an albatross around the 
proposal’s neck that dragged it into the realm of the least possible. 
Whether or not the lesson history takes from this episode is that 
the EPA’s original, more stringent coal-ash proposal was killed for 
political—as opposed to cost-benefit—reasons, the chilling effect that 
this kind of far-fetched hypothesizing will have on the EPA and other 
health and safety agencies should not be underestimated. For the first 
time in our experience,204 OIRA took the position that (1) if an 
agency declares an activity (disposing of CCRs in an unlined pit) or a 
material (CCRs themselves) to be hazardous, (2) related industries 
might change their conduct based on what economists believe to be 
irrational anxieties about those decisions, and (3) those “irrational” 
reactions might cost industry money over a 50-year period, then (4) 
the agency must quantify the costs of this stigma effect and (5) add 
them to the other costs of the action, all of which may (6) force the 
agency to pull back or terminate its efforts to protect public health. 
Virtually any decision to consider how toxic an under-tested chemical 
may be and whether its use should be restricted, to control the 
disposal of any harmful waste, or to require new performance 
standards for facilities that release pollutants into the environment 
could be found to have a stigmatizing effect on some aspect of 
commerce. This would trigger elaborate calculations of the effect’s 
economic burden that could swamp the calculations of the benefit of 
regulatory controls. Given the power of this chilling effect on health, 
 
 201.   For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Steinzor, supra note 23, at 264–69. 
 202.   EPA, supra note 200, at 11, Exhibit 6, 187–88, Exhibit 5C-21 (2010). 
 203.   75 Fed. Reg. at 35,128. 
 204.   We share a combined seven decades of working within, observing, and critically 
analyzing the regulatory system that protects public health, worker and consumer safety, and 
the environment. 
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safety, and environmental regulation, the record built by OIRA with 
respect to the stigma effect is shallow to the point of irresponsibility. 
The Final Draft RIA does not contain any citations to sources 
describing how behavioral scientists define and evaluate the so-called 
stigma effect. It acknowledges, again without citation, that to the 
extent behavioral scientists have tried to quantify the stigma effect, 
they have never documented the drastic reduction assumed by 
OIRA’s redraft—which is, that sales of recycled coal ash will drop by 
fifty percent.205 Instead, stigma is accepted as a given not on the basis 
of previous, well-informed research and analysis but because affected 
industries intent on killing the EPA proposal claim it will occur.206 An 
academic literature on the stigma effect exists, but OIRA’s 
economists apparently chose to ignore it. 
It turns out that an impressive roster of behavioral scientists have 
published an entire book analyzing the stigma effect through the 
prism of well-publicized controversies involving the contamination of 
food (mad cow disease or the discovery of polychlorinated biphenyls 
in milk) or drugs (tampering with Tylenol), the siting of nuclear-
waste-disposal facilities, and toxic-waste dump sites.207 The authors 
define stigma as people’s revulsion against substances or practices 
that could prove harmful to their health.208 
In one famous experiment, researchers dipped a “sterilized” 
cockroach in a glass of juice while their human subjects watched, and 
then asked people to drink from the glasses; most refused all such 
requests.209 Similar experiments involving poisoned Tylenol and the 
tainted milk and meat that may derive from mad cows unsurprisingly 
 
 205.    EPA, supra note 200, at 157–59. 
 206.    Id. at 157 (“On the other hand, industry and state government stakeholders have 
asserted in letters to EPA, that regulation of CCR as a RCRA ‘hazardous waste’ will impose a 
‘stigma’ on CCR beneficial use which will significantly curtail these uses. In their view, even an 
action that regulates only the disposal of CCR in landfills or surface impoundments as 
hazardous waste, but retains the Bevill exemption for beneficial uses, would have this effect.”). 
 207.    PAUL SLOVIC ET AL., RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA: UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC 
CHALLENGES TO MODERN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (James Flynn et al. eds., 2001) 
[hereinafter RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA]. 
 208.    See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Defining Stigma, in RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA, supra 
note 207, at 361 (defining stigma as the “refusal to engage in an act that would otherwise be 
acceptable”); Robin Gregory et al., Technological Stigma, in RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA, supra 
note 207, at 296. 
 209.    Paul Rozin, Technological Stigma: Some Perspectives from the Study of Contagion, in 
RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA, supra note 207, at 31–33. 
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provided similar results: the average person exhibits revulsion over 
the contamination and is anxious to avoid exposure.210 
Perhaps the OIRA economists ignored this research because the 
reaction of people asked to drink a contaminated beverage on its face 
has very little to do with how electric utilities respond to any 
regulation that could cost them money. One situation simply has very 
little to do with the other. It is tempting to surmise, however, that to 
the extent that they were familiar with this research, the OIRA 
economists did not want to highlight the behavioral scientists’ 
recommended solutions to the stigma effect. To a person, the 
scientists urge government to combat stigma with public education, 
efforts to restore trust in government, and—ultimately—more 
protective regulation.211 Had OIRA absorbed the research and these 
recommendations—had it, in fact, maintained an open mind and 
followed the implications of the behavioral research to its logical 
conclusion—the upshot might very well have been to either dismiss 
the stigma effect altogether or, at the very least, to assign it a much 
lower number. Instead, playing into the industry’s strategy for killing 
the rule, OIRA ensured that EPA and Congress received the clear 
message that the rule was on shaky footing within the Obama 
Administration, and therefore vulnerable to the final stage of blood-
sport policymaking. 
C. Advertising and Astroturf 
A coalition of coal and utility companies spent around thirty-five 
million dollars on television advertising criticizing several EPA 
regulatory proposals, including the coal-ash rule.212 One ad featured a 
businessman with a briefcase struggling to stay aboard a bucking bull 
while the narrator observed that “too many Americans are just trying 
to hang onto their jobs” and wondered why the EPA was “in a rush to 
 
 210.  Michael R. Edelstein, Crying over Spoiled Milk: Contamination, Visibility, and 
Expectation in Environmental Stigma, in RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA, supra note 207, at 41–68; 
Douglas Powell, Mad Cow Disease and the Stigmatization of British Beef, in RISK, MEDIA, AND 
STIGMA, supra note 207, at 219–28; Mark L. Mitchell, The Impact of External Parties on Brand-
Name Capital: The 1982 Tylenol Poisonings and Subsequent Cases, in RISK, MEDIA, AND 
STIGMA, supra note 207, at 203–17. 
 211.  See Howard Kunreuther & Paul Slovic, Coping with Stigma: Challenges and 
Opportunities, in RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA, supra note 207, at 331, 334. 
 212.  See Daniel J. Weiss, Poor Little Big Coal Says EPA Smog Standards Too Expensive, 
GRIST.ORG (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.grist.org/coal/2011-11-17-poor-little-big-coal-says-epa-
smog-standards-too-expensive; Anna Palmer & David Levinthal, Energy Wars, POLITICO.COM 
(Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.politico.com/politicoinfluence/0811/politicoinfluence74.html.  
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push regulations that would saddle Americans with higher energy 
costs and throw even more of us out of work?” The narrator then 
urged the viewer to tell Congress that “EPA needs to slow down.”213 
As it became clear that the EPA was serious about regulating 
coal ash as a hazardous waste, a group called Citizens for Recycling 
First appeared on the scene. Run by a consultant for the coal-ash 
recycling industry, it was an “Astroturf” group established by the 
industry to create the impression that ordinary citizens strongly 
opposed regulation of coal ash as a hazardous waste. In October 2011, 
the group took advantage of the White House’s “We the People” 
program to submit a petition demanding that the Obama 
Administration not designate coal ash as a hazardous waste.214 The 
group’s website boasted that the petition had attracted more than 
5,000 signatures, but a closer examination by the Environmental 
Integrity Project found that the names were probably generated by “a 
piece of software or a small group of individuals.”215 
D. Congress Strides Backwards 
As is becoming standard operating procedure in high-stakes 
rulemaking, the industry coalition opposing the EPA rule did not 
limit its work to the traditional strategies of lobbying EPA and OIRA 
officials and preparing voluminous comments on the Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM).216 Instead, its lobbyists fanned out 
across Capitol Hill, asking members from states where affected 
companies were located to find ways to delay or terminate the 
rulemaking. This new strategy was significantly more effective 
following the 2010 midterm elections. 
 
 213.  America’s Power, Rodeo: The EPA Needs to Slow Down, YOUTUBE.COM (Sept. 9, 
2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xheNqLlhhFc.  
 214.  See White House Petition Drive Reaches Goal!, CITIZENS FOR RECYCLING FIRST (Oct. 
25, 2011), http://www.recyclingfirst.org/blog/?post=126.  
 215.  Meet Coal Ash’s Fake New Chinese Friends: “Big Steamed Bun” and “Handsome 
Dragon,” ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT (June 28, 2012), http://www.environmentalintegrity.org/ 
news_reports/06_28_2012.php. At least eighty of the names identified in Chinese characters 
referred to “objects or descriptions” like “Steamed Bun, Older Sister, Steamed Bun Little 
Sister, Small Steamed Bun, etc.” Id. 
 216.  For discussions of these blood sport strategies in other contexts, see generally 
McGarity, supra note 32 (considering the battle over debit card fees); Rena Steinzor, The Age of 
Greed and the Sabotage of Regulation, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) 
(describing these tactics in the context of a Department of Labor rulemaking proposal updating 
forty-year-old hazard orders prohibiting children who work on farms from engaging in certain 
activities). 
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The scene was set for such congressional intervention during the 
2010 midterm elections, when candidates put forth by the Tea Party 
faction of the Republican Party routinely blamed many of the 
nation’s economic problems on environmental regulation.217 Whether 
or not these attacks had a decisive effect on the final vote, the 
electorate returned control of the House of Representatives to a 
Republican Party with a vocal Tea Party faction that was determined 
to prevent the EPA from promulgating more regulations. The mining 
and electric-utility industries contributed heavily to Republican 
candidates who took an anti-regulatory stance, and they were 
delighted with these election results.218 
The coal and electric-utility industries hoped to persuade 
Congress either to prevent the EPA from finalizing pending 
regulations or, if that approach failed, to force the agency to make the 
regulations it did finalize less burdensome.219 In response to a request 
by Representative Darrell Issa (R-CA) to nominate supposedly “job-
threatening” regulations for repeal or withdrawal, thirteen different 
trade associations nominated the coal-ash rule.220 During the first nine 
months of 2011, mining interests spent $16.5 million and electric 
utility interests spent $78.4 million on this and related lobbying 
activities.221 Members of the American Public Power Association, a 
trade group representing publicly owned utilities in cities like 
Anaheim and Nashville, assembled in Washington, D.C. in early 
March 2011 to take their grievances about the EPA rules directly to 
individual members of Congress.222 
The industry lobbyists were well-received by the Republican 
House majority. The tone of the congressional hearings on coal ash 
shifted dramatically as Republican chairpersons controlled the 
witness list. They stacked the hearings with industry representatives, 
and subjected EPA witnesses to lengthy, hostile questioning that 
 
 217.  Stephen Power, Not on Ballot, but EPA Chief a Campaign Issue, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 
2010, at A4. 
 218.  John M. Broder, Coal Industry Spending to Sway Next Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 
2010, at A12.  
 219.  Philip Rucker & David S. Hilzenrath, House GOP targets Obama regulations, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 7, 2011, at A1.  
 220.  Id. 
 221.  Manuel Quinones, Coal Industry Deploys Donations, Lobbying as Its Issues Gain 
Prominence, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/10/13/ 
13greenwire-coal-industry-deploys-donations-lobbying-as-it-45582.html?pagewanted=all.  
 222.  Lynn Garner, EPA Plan to Limit Emissions Said to Pose “Imminent Threat” to Coal-
Fired Power Plants, 42 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 426 (2011).  
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sometimes pressed the boundaries of congressional decorum.223 
Sympathetic members supported stand-alone bills to divest the EPA 
of authority to regulate many aspects of power plant pollution, 
including coal ash. The Republican leadership was also receptive to 
attempts to circumvent the normal procedures for enacting legislation 
by attaching the contents of stand-alone bills to “must-pass” 
legislation, such as appropriations and transportation-reauthorization 
legislation, which was not likely to be killed in the Senate or vetoed 
by President Obama. 
The first opportunity for Congress to halt EPA rulemaking was 
the continuing resolution that had to pass at the outset of the 112th 
Congress to appropriate funds for the government agencies for the 
remainder of the 2011 fiscal year.224 Because President Obama would 
be very reluctant to veto the bill, triggering a government shutdown 
until a new continuing resolution could be passed, the legislation was 
virtually veto-proof. It did, however, have to get through the 
Democrat-controlled Senate. When the continuing resolution came to 
the floor of the House for a vote, Representative David McKinley (R-
WV) offered a so-called “limitation” rider to prevent the EPA from 
expending any of the appropriated funds for the purpose of 
classifying coal ash as a hazardous waste.225 This restriction would 
have effectively terminated the coal-ash rulemaking for the 
remainder of the fiscal year. Whether the agency could resume the 
rulemaking at the end of FY 2011 would depend on whether the FY 
2012 appropriation contained a similar rider. The full House 
approved the rider, along with a number of other riders aimed at 
terminating ongoing EPA rulemaking initiatives. But the final deal on 
the continuing resolution reached among the Speaker of the House, 
Senate leaders, and President Obama removed the rider from the 
bill.226 Environmental groups breathed a sigh of relief, although they 
realized that the continuing resolution battle was just “an opening 
act” for future battles over EPA rules.227 
 
 223.   See McGarity, supra note 32, at 1726. 
 224.   See Senate Democrats Vow to Drop EPA Policy Measures from FY11 Budget Bill, 
INSIDE EPA (Feb. 25, 2011), http://environmentalnewsstand.com/Inside-EPA/Inside-EPA-
02/25/2011/menu-id-298.html (follow link to article). 
 225.   157 Cong. Rec. H. 1318, 1342 (2011).  
 226.   Amena H. Saiyid, EPA Riders Are Out of Spending Bill, But Analysts Say Battle Is Far 
from Over, 42 ENV'T REP. CUR. DEV. (BNA) 816 (Apr. 15, 2011). 
 227.   Id. (quoting Marty Hayden, Earthjustice).  
McGarity 12.17 (Do Not Delete) 12/17/2012  2:51 PM 
Fall 2012] THE END GAME OF DEREGULATION 133 
Later that month, the Subcommittee on Environment and the 
Economy of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce held a 
hearing on a free-standing bill entitled the Recycling Coal 
Combustion Residuals Accessibility Act. That Act would have 
prohibited the EPA from regulating coal ash as a hazardous waste 
and given the states authority to regulate the disposal of CCRs.228 The 
hearing featured testimony by EPA Assistant Administrator Mathy 
Stanislaus who told the committee that the problems with CCR 
retention ponds “could be addressed easily if disposal units were 
installed with proper liners, groundwater monitoring, and fugitive 
dust controls with an effective government oversight framework.”229 
Underscoring the fact that the rule would not regulate beneficial uses 
of coal ash in any way, he stressed the need for “an effective oversight 
role to ensure CCR regulations are properly implemented and 
enforced.”230 He said that the agency preferred to consider all of the 
possible regulatory options, including regulating coal ash as a 
hazardous waste, and he complained that the bill would take that 
option away from the agency.231 
Throughout the hearing, Republican congressmen took 
Stanislaus to task for the agency’s failure to conduct an economic 
analysis that specifically focused on jobs in addition to the extensive 
economic analysis contained in the Draft RIA for the proposed 
rule.232 Representative Cory Gardner (R-CO) berated Stanislaus for 
analyzing the impact of the rule on environmental justice, but not the 
impact on jobs.233 When Representative David McKinley (R-WV) 
pressed Stanislaus to give his opinion as to whether coal ash was 
toxic, Stanislaus pointed out that the agency was “in the middle of a 
rulemaking,” and the toxicity of coal ash was one of the issues that 
the rulemaking would resolve.234 Alluding to the stigmatizing effect of 
regulating CCRs under Subtitle C, Representative McKinley then 
demanded to know what “corporate liability lawyers” would “tell 
companies about creating wall board for use in homes, hazardous 
 
 228.  The Recycling Coal Combustion Residuals Accessibility Act of 2011: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Env’t and the Econ. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong., 
1st Sess. (2011) (Testimony of Mathy Stanislaus, EPA), at 6. 
 229.  Id. at 8.  
 230.  Id. 
 231.  Id. at 8. 
 232.  See id. at 16–18, 44–46, 50–51. 
 233.  Id. at 50. 
 234.  Id. at 51. 
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material.”235 Stanislaus tried to explain again—to no avail—that the 
EPA proposal exempted recycled coal ash used in products like 
wallboard and that the central issue for the rulemaking was the 
characteristics of coal ash when mismanaged in a retention pond and 
not its characteristics when put to beneficial uses.236 
The House Energy and Commerce Committee reported out the 
legislation, now titled the Coal Residuals Reuse and Management 
Act, in mid-July 2011. It divested the EPA of its authority to regulate 
CCRs and set forth general standards for state regulation of disposal 
sites. 237 The EPA would retain the authority to seek an injunction to 
prevent an imminent hazard, but it would lack inspection and 
enforcement authority over the old dump sites like the surface 
impoundment that collapsed at Kingston.238 As the bill came up for a 
floor vote, the White House issued a statement opposing the measure, 
but stopped short of threatening a veto.239 The full House approved 
the bill by a vote of 267 to 144 on October 14, 2011.240 According to 
House speaker John Boehner, the vote demonstrated that 
Republicans were fulfilling their promise to stop the Obama 
Administration from issuing regulations that threatened jobs.241 But 
two weeks after the House passed the legislation, a bluff at the We 
Energies’ power plant adjacent to Lake Michigan in Oak Creek, 
Wisconsin gave way and discharged 2,500 cubic yards of soil 
contaminated with coal ash into Lake Michgan.242 Perhaps influenced 
by this episode, Democrats on the Senate Committee on 
Environment and Public Works did not even schedule a hearing for 
the House legislation. 
House advocates soon discovered another must-pass piece of 
legislation: the transportation-reauthorization bill. They approved a 
rider containing the text of the coal-ash bill they had previously 
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passed as a stand-alone measure.243 Hoping that the Senate would not 
remove the rider in the conference committee, industry coalition 
lobbyists visited each of the individual conferees.244 They also 
succeeded in persuading eighty-one representatives to sign a letter to 
the House conferees urging them to insist that the rider be retained in 
the conference committee’s bill.245 The Utility Solid Waste Activities 
Group created a website called “Regulate Coal Ash Right” to appeal 
to citizens to “tell Congress to include bipartisan coal ash provisions 
in the surface transportation bill.”246 It was all for naught, however, as 
the Democratic senators on the conference committee refused to go 
forward with a bill containing the rider.247 
Meanwhile, after suffering defeats at OIRA and Congress, 
environmental groups sought refuge in the courts, filing an “agency 
forcing” lawsuit against the EPA seeking a court order requiring the 
agency to issue a final coal-ash rule by a prescribed deadline.248 The 
largest manufacturer of CCRs for beneficial use filed its own lawsuit 
and asked that it be consolidated with the environmental groups’ 
suit.249 Fearing that the EPA would settle the lawsuit on terms 
favorable to the environmental groups, the chairman of the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce and the chairman of its 
Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy wrote a letter to 
EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson urging her not to settle the 
litigation.250 In late June 2012, two industry groups intervened in the 
lawsuit so that they would be parties to any settlement negotiations.251 
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Although Congress has not yet enacted legislation cutting off the 
coal-ash rulemaking, several near misses suggest the battle is likely to 
be renewed after the 2012 national elections. 
IV. LESSONS AND SOLUTIONS 
A. Lessons 
1. Disasters with No Response 
As we mentioned at the outset, widely publicized, anthropogenic 
disasters can create a crisis atmosphere capable of opening policy-
making “windows,” as the political scientist John Kingdon described 
the delicate point in time when all factors are aligned toward action.252 
Regulatory agencies always have many more issues on their plates 
than they can possibly address with their limited resources; and they 
are increasingly intimidated by the gauntlet they must run to push 
proposals that well-connected industries oppose through centralized 
White House review. Congress must struggle to overcome its own 
inertia on regulatory issues; the laws are complex and their 
reauthorization has always inspired similarly intense resistance from 
regulated industries.253 Historically, disasters have cut through these 
Gordian knots, largely because they provided progressive activists 
with the grassroots momentum needed to overcome the “collective 
action” problem identified by economist Mancur Olson.254 
The costs of complying with regulations are borne directly by the 
regulated industries, while the benefits of regulatory protections are 
spread among thousands or millions of individuals, no single one of 
whom has a strong enough incentive to seek regulatory change aimed 
at internalizing those costs.255 But disgust at the sight of the Cuyahoga 
River on fire, or fear that an American chemical plant could erupt 
with the lethal effect of the Union Carbide facility in Bhopal, India, 
historically served to galvanize enough public support for 
environmental protection laws that the EPA and Congress were 
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compelled to respond.256 Members of Congress moved toward 
compromise, although the resulting legislation may be too narrow or 
weak to empower the relevant agency to prevent the next tragedy. 
Until recently, a catastrophe of the order of magnitude of the 
Kingston spill would have pushed an issue to the front of the 
policymaking agenda. As the national media focused on the causes of 
the tragedy, advocates for the victims pointed to regulatory failures or 
the inadequacy of statutes designed to prevent a second catastrophe, 
generating an opportunity to pressure agencies and members of 
Congress into a meaningful response.257 But the Kingston disaster, 
along with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and the Upper Big Branch 
mine tragedy, did not follow this long-standing historical trend. As 
always, victims demanded action, the media reported on the human 
misery left in the wake of the three events, and Congress—at least 
initially—decried industry negligence, goaded regulators, and 
demanded a response. Yet Congress did not enact legislation and 
regulators who tried to respond were stymied. 
Whether these developments mark a new, diametrically opposed 
trend or a brief departure from the usual response is impossible to 
determine with certainty. But we fear that the deep polarization of 
the nation’s public affairs suggests that the human, natural, and 
economic costs of such fiascos may need to rise sharply higher before 
dysfunctional executive and legislative branches kick back into gear. 
In this final section, we explain our prognosis and suggest the 
conditions that would be necessary to prove us wrong. 
We are well aware, of course, that participants in regulated 
industries and their political allies believe that the reason the White 
House and Congress fail to act is that a regulatory response is not 
warranted on the merits. We reject that explanation. Instead, we 
believe that the sharp imbalance of economic power that gives 
regulated industries a louder voice than ordinary citizens and public 
interest groups in both the legislative and regulatory fora lies at the 
root of these changes. This imbalance reached its tipping point with 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
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Commission,258 which raised the stakes for political fundraising from 
business entities to an unprecedented level. This trend toward 
industry dominance not just of the traditional administrative process, 
but of political arenas as well, is compounded by the public’s loss of 
trust in government, a phenomenon that makes galvanizing public 
sentiment for law reform extraordinarily difficult. 
2. Industry Dominance of the Process 
Empirical studies demonstrate that regulated parties dominate 
every stage of the rulemaking process, from pre-proposal negotiations 
with the agency over the content of the rule, to submission of 
comments on the proposal, to judicial challenges of the final rule. 
Because public interest groups have lagged far behind their industry 
counterparts in effort and intensity, the agencies are under 
tremendous pressure to default to proposals that weaken regulatory 
requirements. 
The Center for Public Integrity discovered that industry groups 
opposed to climate change legislation hired four lobbyists for every 
individual member of Congress, for a total of approximately 2,340 
such representatives, compared to the 185 fielded by public interest 
groups.259 This dominance on Capitol Hill is mirrored by higher rates 
of industry participation in administrative proceedings. A survey of 
Washington-based interest groups found that individual businesses 
participated in over twice the number of rulemakings as other types 
of organizations.260 Another study, examining comments filed on 
eleven proposed regulations at three agencies, found the same 
business dominance.261 Corporations, public utilities, and trade 
associations filed between 66.7% and 100% of the comments 
concerning EPA and National Highway Traffic Administration rules, 
and public interest groups did not file any comments regarding five of 
the eight rules included in the study.262 
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In the fall of 2011, the Center for Progressive Reform (CPR), an 
organization that we helped found, released the most ambitious 
empirical study of White House regulatory review yet conducted, 
covering 6,194 separate regulatory proposals and final rules 
considered during the period from October 16, 2001 to June 1, 2011.263 
Over the course of the decade, OIRA officials met 1,080 times with 
5,759 participants.264 Sixty-five percent of attendees represented 
industry, about five times the number of people who appeared on 
behalf of public interest groups.265 The EPA was given attention far 
disproportionate to its regulatory output: a surprising 442 of the 1,080 
meetings involved regulatory matters that originated at the EPA even 
though the agency accounted for only eleven percent of the matters 
that OIRA reviewed.266 Most troubling of all, CPR discovered that 
OIRA changes eighty-four percent of EPA rules and sixty-five 
percent of all other rules before releasing them to the public.267 
Not surprisingly, as the coal-ash rulemaking demonstrates, 
industry dominance of the process has a discernible impact on 
rulemaking outcomes. One recent study of EPA rules regulating 
hazardous air pollutants concluded that changes to the substance of 
rules in response to public comments favored industry by a five-to-
one margin.268 Professor David Driesen examined twenty-five rules 
identified by a GAO study as significantly affected by centralized 
review, concluding that OIRA-recommended changes reduced 
regulatory protections with respect to twenty-four of the rules, while 
the one remaining change was neutral.269 
Industry advocates in many high-stakes rulemakings are now 
willing to spend millions of dollars to achieve their regulatory goals 
by lobbying agency staff and members of Congress. They employ 
non-traditional tactics such as public relations campaigns replete with 
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attack advertising, coordination with think tanks, media pundits, and 
bloggers.270 These blood-sport strategies, several of which were on full 
display during the EPA’s coal-ash rulemaking, go a long way toward 
explaining the failure of Congress and the EPA to put protective laws 
and regulations into place in the wake of the Kingston disaster.271 
If we are right that corporate dominance of national 
policymaking in the health and safety arena is the most important 
reason for the failure to respond to disasters, why have the American 
people failed to respond more sharply to what many would regard to 
be a corrupt state of affairs in the American political economy? 
3. Loss of the Public Trust 
No one was killed in the Kingston disaster, and only a few homes 
were destroyed. The damage was limited to a few hundred acres of 
land and a couple of rivers. Mayhem of this magnitude is available on 
almost a daily basis as television outlets operating on a 24-7 news 
cycle search for stories dramatic enough to attract viewers. A 
constant diet of disasters may have rendered the American public 
incapable of either empathy with the victims or outrage over the 
callous disregard for public safety displayed by the corporate actors 
who caused the harm. This sense of ennui may well have been 
exacerbated by government’s failure to provide adequate protective 
responses to serious crises so many times in the past decade—
Hurricane Katrina, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Upper Big 
Branch mining explosion—that people no longer trust government to 
respond when catastrophes provide dramatic examples of the failure 
of self-regulation, which is the only alternative to government 
regulation.272 
In our view, the current distrust of governmental solutions to 
social problems has at least three sources. First, thirty years of 
debilitating attacks on government by the conservative media echo-
chamber and irresponsible congressional leaders have convinced 
many Americans that government officials are by nature less 
competent and more corruptible than their equivalents in the private 
sector.273 Dubbed “bureaucracy bashing” by political scientists,274 this 
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practice has “when all else fails, kick the dog” overtones because it 
involves blaming bureaucrats every time something goes wrong that 
could conceivably fall within the government’s authority to 
accomplish or prevent. This narrative is especially disturbing when it 
combines the American commitment to individual freedom with the 
suggestion that government employees are determined to deprive 
their fellow citizens of their liberty. An extreme example is House 
Majority Whip Tom DeLay’s attempt on the floor of the House to 
equate EPA officials with the Gestapo.275 Although this comparison 
may have lost some of its potency through constant, mindless 
repetition, its use by a prominent national official should be 
exceptionally disturbing to those familiar with the ghastly events of 
the Holocaust. 
And we are not alone. The DeLay comment was made in 1995, 
the same year that Timothy McVeigh bombed the Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma City. In a moving speech paying 
homage to the 168 victims of the attack, President Clinton said: “there 
is nothing patriotic about hating your country or pretending that you 
can love your country but despise your Government.”276 Although the 
President was specifically referring to local militias, at least one 
scholar before us, Professor Thad Hall, has argued that he was 
drawing a link between bureaucracy bashing in Congress and this 
stunning act of violence against the civil service.277 
Second, putting aside the argument that such extreme attitudes 
are quite dangerous to the body politic, the varying degrees of disdain 
for government officials among members of the public have produced 
a serious brain drain among the civil service as well as deep cuts in its 
ranks. This has in turn further alienated citizens, who no longer 
identify public service as a noble calling. The National Commission 
for the Public Service, chaired by the estimable Paul Volcker, former 
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chair of the Federal Reserve Board, addressed this reality in 2003 
without mincing any words: 
Trust in government—strong after World War II, with the United 
States assuming international leadership and meeting domestic 
challenges—has eroded. Government’s responsiveness, its 
efficiency, and too often its honesty are broadly challenged as we 
enter a new century. The bonds between our citizens and our public 
servants, essential to democratic government, are frayed even as 
the responsibilities of government at home and abroad have 
increased. Government work ought to be a respected source of 
pride. All too frequently it is not. . . . The notion of public service, 
once a noble calling proudly pursued by the most talented 
Americans of every generation, draws an indifferent response from 
today’s young people and repels many of the country’s leading 
private citizens.278 
Finally, thirty years of budget cuts and debilitating ideological 
attacks on regulatory agencies have rendered them incapable of 
delivering the protections that we rightly expect.279 The EPA, which 
started out on such a positive and energetic note after Kingston, was 
ultimately beaten into submission, at least for the foreseeable future. 
People are not wrong, of course, when they express 
disillusionment with the government’s performance, especially during 
a crisis. But disappointment does not have to lead to distrust. Long-
standing Washington Post columnist and reporter, Jim Hoagland, 
once wrote: 
Americans distrust government’s powers and motives. They 
immediately get the joke that has a federal inspector or a state 
administrator fatuously saying, “We’re from the government and 
here to help.” Such suspicion is a healthy instinct—but one that is 
being carried to destructive and demagogic lengths.280 
If any country in the world is equipped to maintain both a healthy 
suspicion of and a sense of humor about government, all without 
succumbing to ideologues who are trying to destroy its capacity to 
protect those who need the help, it is this one, however far the ship of 
state has rolled to the intemperate starboard in recent years. 
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B. Solutions 
1. Restoring Public Trust 
The foregoing explanations for the failure of either Congress or 
the EPA to provide an effective response to the Kingston catastrophe 
may leave the reader wondering what can stimulate protective 
governmental action if crises generated by dramatic disasters are no 
longer capable of doing so. If our society cannot learn from the 
mistakes that become apparent in the most extreme catastrophes, 
how can it possibly avoid their future recurrence? And if government 
has become so ineffective that it can no longer require risk-fraught 
industries to prevent these events, to what institutions can the 
potential victims of the next disaster turn? 
To a large degree, we share this feeling of helplessness, but we 
take some comfort in the fact that identifying the cause of a disease is 
the first step toward deriving a cure. In this part of the Article we do 
not pretend to have a cure, and the suggestions that we offer here 
may seem quixotic to some. But we offer them as a first step on the 
way back to a political economy in which anthropogenic disasters are 
less frequent and government reacts to the disasters that do occur by 
putting into place regulatory programs designed to prevent similar 
disasters in the future. 
We believe that very little progress toward effective 
governmental responses to environmental disasters is likely if we do 
not first restore public trust in the ability of government to address 
social problems. And the first step toward restoring public trust is to 
rebuild the governmental institutions that have the responsibility to 
protect people from environmental disasters. At the same time, 
supporters of proactive governmental intervention must displace the 
business community’s well-honed, anti-government narrative with a 
compelling counter-narrative capable of restoring public trust in 
government.281 
2. Rebuilding Government 
Regulatory agencies like the EPA have little chance of regaining 
either their self-respect or the power to control corporate misconduct 
unless the White House and Congress remove themselves from the 
arena where regulatory decisions, guided by decades of carefully 
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crafted law, were meant to be made. Doors must shut all over 
Washington, D.C. The simple act, in all its iterations, of appealing to 
the administrator of OIRA or the chair of an agency’s congressional 
appropriations subcommittee must become an outlier that has an 
appropriate smell of corruption each time a well-heeled corporate 
lobbyist attempts to travel that route.282 Or, to put it another way, the 
blood-sport approach to influencing regulatory decisions must come 
to an end. 
We have two tough audiences to convince that these new tools, 
so treasured by the people that use them, will bring all of us to a bad 
end: (1) the thousands of tacticians who earn good livings deploying 
their blood-sport strategies and the senior corporate executives who 
sponsor their activities and (2) the political advisers to the president. 
 Our message has three parts. First, in regulatory wars of 
attrition, with constantly increasing sums of money needed to derail 
rulemaking initiatives, the first victims may be the hapless millions of 
people who live near coal-ash dumps or who have Chinese drywall in 
their homes. Sooner or later, though, industries will end up squaring 
off against other industries, and the cost of the battles will spiral out 
of control. In a recent article outlining blood-sport strategies, 
Professor McGarity describes an extremely expensive and chaotic 
fight between bankers and retailers over debit card fees that punished 
both sides and left neither the clear victor.283 
One mainstay in the business community’s argument against 
regulation is that, to compete effectively in a global marketplace, 
companies need a degree of certainty that constantly changing rules 
do not provide. Yet the business community is far more dependent on 
the stability that a mature regulatory program can provide than its 
representatives generally care to admit. Even in the era of shrunken 
government envisioned by Fredrich von Hayek, Milton Friedman, 
and Grover Norquist, governmental regulation will persist to make 
and enforce the rules that make markets possible by providing a level 
competitive playing field and by giving consumers confidence that 
they and their families will not be cheated or injured by irresponsible 
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companies.284 The question the business community now faces is 
whether it is better off rolling the dice in increasingly expensive 
political gambles over the content of the regulations that must 
inevitably govern the global marketplace or returning to a regulatory 
system in which expert judgment plays a prominent role and long-
standing statutory policies are afforded due respect. 
Second, politicians who are inclined to regard shrinking 
government as the solution to every social problem must be prepared 
to accept the responsibility for future disasters when the 
consequences fall on their own constituents. As Congress continues to 
reduce the resources available to regulatory agencies and as 
individual members of Congress continue to intervene in the blood-
sport battles that rage over individual rulemaking initiatives, it will 
become increasingly implausible to blame the bureaucrats in charge 
of hamstrung programs for future catastrophes. Additionally, 
advocates for consumers and the environment will be able to point a 
finger with increasing plausibility at the politicians who accepted 
large campaign contributions at the same time that they were 
divesting regulatory agencies of their protective powers. If they would 
like to avoid savage attacks from the victims of the next tragedy 
brought on by a failure of the regulatory system, these politicians may 
be well-advised to rein in their own overly aggressive attacks on 
regulatory agencies during the battles over regulation. 
Finally, the president must return the core responsibility for 
managing regulatory initiatives to the political appointees he selects 
to lead the agencies. Treating highly competent professionals like 
Lisa Jackson as little more than symbolic payoffs to key political 
constituencies, while divesting them of effective control over the most 
important initiatives on their agencies’ agendas, is a strategy that is 
doomed to failure over the long haul. Not only will an administration 
that adopts this strategy take a justified beating in the media when the 
next disaster happens, it will find it far more difficult to persuade 
qualified people to serve in important administration jobs in the 
future. 
Unfortunately, the presidential inclination to locate all 
momentous decisions within the White House walls has increased 
 
 284.   Robert Dreyfuss, Grover Norquist: ‘Field Marshal’ of the Bush Tax Plan, THE 
NATION (May 14, 2001), http://www.thenation.com/article/grover-norquist-field-marshal-bush-
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dramatically during the last two decades. Presidents understandably 
worry about loyalty of the civil service, and they are instinctively 
reluctant to trust senior career officials, many of whom have 
developed their own power bases within agencies and on Capitol Hill. 
Quashing ongoing initiatives by the civil service is, unfortunately, far 
easier for a new White House to accomplish than inspiring 
bureaucrats to act aggressively in the public interest. Presidents have 
dramatically expanded the number of handpicked and loyal staffers 
who work within the ambit of the White House, organizing them into 
various “councils” with broad and shifting portfolios. The 
consequences of centralized review are that career employees must 
report up a long chain of authority before taking significant action 
and that regulated industries have multiple opportunities for political 
appeals to reverse decisions they lost at the agency level. 
As one of the oldest and most entrenched institutions of 
centralized review, OIRA poses a formidable bottleneck for 
protective regulation in both Republican and Democratic 
administrations. Its staff is composed mostly of economists with 
training in the details of cost-benefit analysis but scant experience 
with the other disciplines, such as science and engineering, needed to 
inform regulatory policy making.285 At the same time, the agencies 
have developed their own sophisticated capacity to analyze the costs 
and benefits of rules and are perfectly capable of advising the political 
appointee who leads the relevant agency of broader policy 
implications of particular rulemaking initiatives. 
Centralized review hides policymaking behind closed doors, 
wastes limited government resources, complicates agency priority-
setting, demoralizes civil servants, and costs the nation dearly in lost 
lives, avoidable illness and injury, and destruction of irreplaceable 
natural resources. President Obama’s preoccupation with centralized 
review has undermined an important symbolic and programmatic 
goal of his potentially transformative presidency because it has 
obscured the urgency of reinvigorating health, safety, and 
environmental agencies. Left uncorrected, this mistake may define his 
historical legacy in the same negative way that a similar 
preoccupation with control has already defined the legacy of his 
predecessor, George W. Bush. 
 
    285.  Steinzor, supra note 23, at 283. 
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3. Changing the Narrative 
Business groups have gained a great deal of political traction 
with a powerful narrative based on economic freedom. They claim 
that economic freedom is a necessary precondition to political and 
individual freedom, and they easily adapt the concept to corporate 
entities as well as individuals.286 Freedom is a widely shared human 
value, but so is security. Most Americans understand that economic 
freedom allows corporations to develop innovative products, to 
match those products to consumer desires, and to provide useful 
services to consumers at the lowest cost. But they also know that 
corporations can use that freedom irresponsibly to defraud their 
customers and harm their neighbors. Since corporations cannot be 
motivated by concerns for others unless those others contribute to 
their bottom lines, government must provide for the economic and 
physical security of its citizens. Proponents of protective 
governmental regulation have an opportunity to enlarge this concept 
to include the shared value of economic and physical security that 
should be at least as compelling as the business community’s focus on 
its own freedom, especially in an era when corporations are making 
record profits but not creating jobs at nearly the same pace.287 
During the Public Interest Era of the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
consumer and environmental advocates invoked a narrative that 
focused on corporate responsibility for the harms caused by 
dangerous products and activities. During the past thirty years, the 
business community has successfully redirected the corporate 
responsibility narrative into a story about how companies can 
voluntarily adopt more responsible approaches out of concern for 
corporate image and the health of the economy. In the wake of the 
recent confluence of crises, however, this perversion of the corporate 
responsibility narrative has lost its vitality, and public interest 
advocates have an opportunity to reinvigorate it in support of 
stronger governmental protections.288 
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 287.  Michael Powell, Corporate Profits Are Booming, Why Aren’t the Jobs?, N.Y. TIMES, 
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(Aug. 5, 2011).  
 288.  Anthony J. Sebok, Dispatches from the Tort Wars, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1465, 1506 (2007). 
McGarity 12.17 (Do Not Delete) 12/17/2012  2:51 PM 
148 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 23:93 
When the investigations that invariably follow a disaster 
conclude that a company’s irresponsible conduct played a role in 
causing the disaster, both the victims and the general public typically 
demand that the company be held accountable for its wrongdoing. A 
regulatory agency with an aggressive and well-financed enforcement 
division is one institution that can hold corporations and their officers 
and employees accountable for their misdeeds. Thus, corporate 
accountability could provide the foundation for a third branch of the 
narrative about the role of government in society. 
Finally, disasters demonstrate in a dramatic way the social costs 
of irresponsible corporate activities. In the absence of a perfectly 
functioning tort system, regulatory agencies are in the best position to 
minimize the social costs of company-caused disasters that society 
ultimately bears through increased insurance premiums and taxes 
invested in Medicare and Medicaid. Thus, a social-costs narrative 
should resonate fairly robustly in a declining economy characterized 
by large budget deficits and few new taxes. 
These four narratives, and perhaps others, offer an alternative to 
the economic freedom narrative that has dominated the political 
economy for the last three decades. If carefully nourished and deftly 
deployed during disasters, these narratives can contribute to the 
daunting task of rebuilding trust in government in general and 
regulatory agencies in particular. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The failure of Congress and the Obama Administration to react 
to the Kingston disaster with either protective legislation or 
regulation may be part of a larger phenomenon that does not bode 
well for the resuscitation of the health, safety, and environmental 
regulatory system in this country. Congress did not enact legislation 
in response to the April 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster, and the 
regulatory response consisted largely of reorganizing and renaming 
the pitifully ineffectual agency that had regulated deepwater drilling 
in the past.289 The same failure to respond accompanied the Upper 
Big Branch explosion of April 2010 and the massive Kingston 
Tennessee spill of December 2008. If public trust in government 
remains at its current low level and the institutions responsible for 
protecting citizens from environmental disasters remain in their 
current dysfunctional state, we can expect more dramatic disasters in 
 
 289.  See MCGARITY, supra note 23.  
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the future. If, however, supporters of good government and sound 
environmental protection can create a new narrative to counter an 
increasingly implausible anti-government creed, and if Congress can 
be persuaded to provide adequate resources to agencies like the 
EPA, we may find ourselves on the road toward a government that 
protects us from domestic disasters as well as it protects us against 
foreign attack. 
